IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies

  • L. Bagnoli
  • G. Negroni
Registered author(s):

    Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are considered. In both, bargaining proceeds according to the Nash Demand Game when a symmetric investments profile is observed. When, on the other hand, an asymmetric investments profile is observed, we assume that bargaining proceeds according to the Ultimatum Game in one case and according to a Dictator Game in the other. We hereby show that in both games when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists it supports an homogeneous behavior in the whole population both at the investment stage and at the distribution stage. A norm of investment and a norm of division must therefore coevolve in the two games, supporting both the efficient investment profile and the egalitarian distribution of the surplus, respectively. The two games differ depending on the conditions needed for the two norms to coevolve. The games are proposed to explain the social norms used in modern hunter-gatherer societies.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www2.dse.unibo.it/wp/WP858.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number wp858.

    as
    in new window

    Length:
    Date of creation: Dec 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp858
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Piazza Scaravilli, 2, and Strada Maggiore, 45, 40125 Bologna
    Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
    Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
    Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2002. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 28-53, April.
    2. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    3. Noeldecke,Georg & Samuelson,Larry, . "An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 228, University of Bonn, Germany.
    4. Matthew J. Baker & Kurtis Swope, 2004. "Sharing, Gift-Giving, and Optimal Resource Use Incentives in Hunter-Gatherer Society," Departmental Working Papers 8, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
    5. Dawid, Herbert & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2008. "Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 26-52, January.
    6. Binmore, Ken & Shaked, Avner, 2010. "Experimental economics: Where next?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 87-100, January.
    7. Hackett, Steven C, 1994. "Is Relational Exchange Possible in the Absence of Reputations and Repeated Contact?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 360-89, October.
    8. Binmore, Ken & Shaked, Avner, 2010. "Experimental Economics: Where Next? Rejoinder," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 120-121, January.
    9. Ellison, Glenn, 2000. "Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 17-45, January.
    10. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
    11. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    12. Herbert Dawid and Bentley MacLeod, 2001. "Holdup and the Evolution of Bargaining Conventions," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 104, Society for Computational Economics.
    13. Hackett, Steven C, 1993. "Incomplete Contracting: A Laboratory Experimental Analysis," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(2), pages 274-97, April.
    14. Troger, Thomas, 2002. "Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 375-402, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp858. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Miselli)

    The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Luca Miselli to update the entry or send us the correct address

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.