An evolutionary theory of social justice: Choosing the right game
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- Esat Cetemen & Emin Karagözoğlu, 2014. "Implementing equal division with an ultimatum threat," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 223-236, August.
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More about this item
KeywordsSocial justice Social contract Nash Demand Game Equilibrium selection;
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