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On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies

Author

Listed:
  • Giorgio Negroni

    (University of Bologna)

  • Lidia Bagnoli

    (Ministry of Economy and Finance)

Abstract

We study the evolutionary origin of a social norm of the kind “cooperate frequently and share fully” observed in modern hunter–gatherers. In order to do this, a two-stage game in which a pie has first to be produced and then divided is proposed. We assume that the bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior and to the degree of property rights protection. We show that, when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists, a norm of investment and a norm of division coevolve supporting the efficient investment profile and the egalitarian distribution of the surplus, respectively. The conditions needed for norms to coevolve depend on whether property rights over the fruits of one’s own independent investment are secured or not.

Suggested Citation

  • Giorgio Negroni & Lidia Bagnoli, 2017. "On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 12(3), pages 635-667, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jeicoo:v:12:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11403-016-0180-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11403-016-0180-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolution; Social norms; Stochastically stable equilibrium; Modern hunter–gatherer societies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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