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Promiscuous Elites and Economic Development

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  • Elise S. Brezis

    (Bar-Ilan University)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the interconnection between elites and its effects on economic growth. For decades, the bureaucratic elite has been joining the business elite after leaving office, and this in growing numbers. This relationship has been termed “the revolving door” in English, “pantouflage” in French, and “amakudari” [descent from heaven] in Japanese. The purpose of this paper is to explain why this social behavior takes place, and why the political elite does not try to prevent it. Moreover, this paper shows that the bureaucratic elite obtains excessive bureaucratic power, and that promiscuous elites actually lead to lower economic growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Elise S. Brezis, 2012. "Promiscuous Elites and Economic Development," Working Papers 2012-09, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:biu:wpaper:2012-09
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
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    3. Mark Gradstein, 2007. "Inequality, democracy and the protection of property rights," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(516), pages 252-269, January.
    4. David J. Salant, 1995. "Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 362-377, Autumn.
    5. Easterly, William, 2001. "The Middle Class Consensus and Economic Development," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 317-335, December.
    6. Eckert, Ross D, 1981. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissioners," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 113-120, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    elites; bureaucracy; abuse of power; revolving door; economic growth.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • O11 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth

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