Minimising monetary policy
The response of leading central banks to the current financial crisis has raised the magnitude of the financial and governance risks they face. An evaluation of the financial strength of a number of those banks suggests that they are in little danger of being forced by financial losses to alter their policies. Governance risks cannot be dismissed so lightly. In engaging extensively in unorthodox policies - bearing similarities to fiscal policy - a number of central banks have risked a critical examination of their governance structures and thereby potentially jeopardised their monetary policy independence. In order to forestall this risk to monetary policy, it is argued that unconventional policies be placed under a separate governance structure that would allow them to be brought under greater political control and accountability while preserving the operational independence of monetary policy.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2010|
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- Flandreau, Marc, 2007. "Pillars of Globalization: A history of monetary policy targets, 1797-1997," CEPR Discussion Papers 6252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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