Bank runs without self-fulfilling prophecies
This paper proposes that bank runs are unique equilibrium outcomes instead of self-fulfilling prophecies. By assuming that depositors make their withdrawal decisions sequentially, the model provides an equilibrium-selection mechanism in the economy. A bank run would occur if and only if depositors perceive a low return on bank assets. Furthermore, a panic situation arises only when the market information is imperfect. A two-stage variant of the model shows that banks would deliberately offer a demand-deposit contract that is susceptive to bank runs.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2001|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Centralbahnplatz 2, CH - 4002 Basel|
Phone: (41) 61 - 280 80 80
Fax: (41) 61 - 280 91 00
Web page: http://www.bis.org/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Reinhart, Carmen & Kaminsky, Graciela, 1999.
"The twin crises: The causes of banking and balance of payments problems,"
14081, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Graciela L. Kaminsky, 1999. "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 473-500, June.
- Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, 1996. "The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems," International Finance Discussion Papers 544, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Reinhart, Carmen & Kaminsky, Graciela, 2000.
"Las crisis gemelas: las causas de los problemas bancarios y de balanza de pagos
[The twin crises: Te causes of banking and balance of payments problems]," MPRA Paper 13842, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2003.
"Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities,"
Staff General Research Papers Archive
11920, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Frankel, David M. & Morris, Stephen & Pauzner, Ady, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 1-44, January.
- David M. Frankel & Stephen Morris & Ady Pauzner, 2001. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1336, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- David M. Frankel & Stephen Morris & Ady Pauzner, 2000. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1490, Econometric Society.
- Curtis R. Taylor & Thomas D. Jeitschko, 2001. "Local Discouragement and Global Collapse: A Theory of Coordination Avalanches," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 208-224, March.
- Peck, James & Shell, Karl, 2001.
"Equilibrium Bank Runs,"
01-10r, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- David Backus & Silverio Foresi & Liuren Wu, 2002. "Contagion in Financial Markets," Finance 0207009, EconWPA.
- Kaminsky, Graciela L. & Reinhart, Carmen M., 2000.
"On crises, contagion, and confusion,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 145-168, June.
- Jianbo Zhang, 1997. "Strategic Delay and the Onset of Investment Cascades," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 188-205, Spring.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Beslmeisl)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.