It's What You Say Not What You Pay. An Experimental Study of Manager-Employee Relationship in Overcoming Coordination Failure
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References listed on IDEAS
- C.Mónica Capra & Tomomi Tanaka & ColinF. Camerer & Lauren Feiler & Veronica Sovero & CharlesN. Noussair, 2009.
"The Impact of Simple Institutions in Experimental Economies with Poverty Traps,"
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- C. Monica Capra & Tomomi Tanaka & Colin Camerer & Lauren Munyan & Veronica Sovero & Lisa Wang & Charles Noussair, 2005. "The Impact of Simple Institutions in Experimental Economies with Poverty Traps," Emory Economics 0508, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
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More about this item
KeywordsChange; Incentives; Coordination; Communications; experiments; Organizations;
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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