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Externalities in interbank network: results from a dynamic simulation model


  • Michele Manna

    () (Bank of Italy)

  • Alessandro Schiavone

    () (Bank of Italy)


In this paper we conduct a simulation run on a sample of Italian banks where a trigger shock, a one-off event fairly large in size, spreads through the interbank network in a set-up featuring among the actors both commercial banks and the authorities. The banks deleverage to comply with a regulatory capital (leverage) ratio, roll off interbank loans, bid for central bank liquidity, seek help within their own group and dispose of assets. As the shock spreads, borrowers who lack liquid assets may be forced to undertake fire sales, letting their capital position deteriorate. A vicious circle arises in which capital and liquidity risks amplify the crisis. When authorities intervene, unconventional monetary policies smooth the contagion over but these measures become less effective when the shock is very large, when the situation is best addressed by policies aiming at strengthening banks� capital. In a theoretical scenario, in which authorities do not enact specific measures, a small fraction of the banking system (in terms of total assets) may be in default at the end of the simulation, while a larger share of banks would need to be recapitalized.

Suggested Citation

  • Michele Manna & Alessandro Schiavone, 2012. "Externalities in interbank network: results from a dynamic simulation model," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 893, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_893_12

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Adrian, Tobias & Shin, Hyun Song, 2010. "Liquidity and leverage," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 418-437, July.
    2. Paolo Pinotti, 2012. "The Economic Costs of Organized Crime: Evidence from Southern Italy," Working Papers 054, "Carlo F. Dondena" Centre for Research on Social Dynamics (DONDENA), Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi.
    3. Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio, 2011. "Assessing financial contagion in the interbank market: Maximum entropy versus observed interbank lending patterns," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 1114-1127, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pawe{l} Smaga & Mateusz Wili'nski & Piotr Ochnicki & Piotr Arendarski & Tomasz Gubiec, 2016. "Can banks default overnight? Modeling endogenous contagion on O/N interbank market," Papers 1603.05142,
    2. Ivan Alves & Stijn Ferrari & Pietro Franchini & Jean-Cyprien Heam & Pavol Jurca & Sam Langfield & Sebastiano Laviola & Franka Liedorp & Antonio Sánchez & Santiago Tavolaro & Guillaume Vuillemey, 2013. "The structure and resilience of the European interbank market," ESRB Occasional Paper Series 03, European Systemic Risk Board.
    3. E. Gaffeo & M. Molinari, 2015. "Interbank contagion and resolution procedures: inspecting the mechanism," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 637-652, April.

    More about this item


    banking crises; contagion; leverage; interbank market; central bank operations;

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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