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Tracking banks' systemic importance before and after the crisis

Author

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  • Piergiorgio Alessandri

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Sergio Masciantonio

    (Bank of Italy)

  • Andrea Zaghini

    (Bank of Italy)

Abstract

We develop a methodology to identify and rank �systemically important financial institutions� (SIFIs). Our approach is consistent with that followed by the Financial Stability Board but, unlike the latter, it is free of judgment and it is based entirely on publicly available data, thus filling the gap between the official views of the regulator and those that market participants form with their own information set. We apply the methodology on three samples of banks (global, EU and euro area) for the years 2007-12.

Suggested Citation

  • Piergiorgio Alessandri & Sergio Masciantonio & Andrea Zaghini, 2015. "Tracking banks' systemic importance before and after the crisis," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 259, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_259_15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sergio Masciantonio, 2015. "Identifying and Tracking Global, EU, and Eurozone Systemically Important Banks with Public Data," Applied Economics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik), Duncker & Humblot GmbH, Berlin, vol. 61(1), pages 25-64.
    2. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2006. "How Big a Problem is Too Big to Fail? A Review of Gary Stern and Ron Feldman's Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 988-1004, December.
    3. Fabio Panetta & Thomas Faeh & Giuseppe Grande & Corrinne Ho & Michael R King & Aviram Levy & Federico M Signoretti & Marco Taboga & Andrea Zaghini, 2009. "An assessment of financial sector rescue programmes," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 48.
    4. Viral V. Acharya & Philipp Schnabl, 2010. "Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances? The Case of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007-09," NBER Working Papers 16079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Black, Lamont & Correa, Ricardo & Huang, Xin & Zhou, Hao, 2016. "The systemic risk of European banks during the financial and sovereign debt crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 107-125.
    6. Andrea Zaghini, 2014. "Bank Bonds: Size, Systemic Relevance and the Sovereign," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(2), pages 161-184, June.
    7. Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2009. "Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 77-100, Winter.
    8. Bertay, Ata Can & Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2013. "Do we need big banks? Evidence on performance, strategy and market discipline," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 532-558.
    9. Nicola Cetorelli & Linda S. Goldberg, 2012. "Banking Globalization and Monetary Transmission," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(5), pages 1811-1843, October.
    10. Mark J. Flannery, 2014. "Maintaining Adequate Bank Capital," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 46(s1), pages 157-180, February.
    11. Völz, Manja & Wedow, Michael, 2011. "Market discipline and too-big-to-fail in the CDS market: Does banks' size reduce market discipline?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 195-210, March.
    12. Andrew G. Haldane, 2012. "Control Rights (And Wrongs)," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 47-58, June.
    13. Viral V Acharya & Philipp Schnabl, 2010. "Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances? Asset-Backed Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of 2007–09," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 58(1), pages 37-73, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roman Garcia & Dimitri Lorenzani & Daniel Monteiro & Francesco Perticari & Bořek Vašíček & Lukas Vogel, 2021. "Financial Spillover and Contagion Risks in the Euro Area in 2007-2019," European Economy - Discussion Papers 137, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    2. Sergio Masciantonio & Andrea Zaghini, 2017. "Systemic risk and systemic importance measures during the crisis," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1153, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    3. Matteo Foglia & Eliana Angelini, 2021. "The triple (T3) dimension of systemic risk: Identifying systemically important banks," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(1), pages 7-26, January.
    4. Abdelkader DERBALI & Ali LAMOUCHI, 2020. "RETRACTED ARTICLE: The triple (T3) dimension of systemic risk: identifying systemically important banks in Eurozone Abstract: Editor’s Note - This paper has been retracted from our journal due to bogu," Eastern Journal of European Studies, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 11, pages 87-122, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    systemic risk; too big to fail;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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