A general equilibrium model of the oil market
We present a general equilibrium model of the global oil market, in which the oil price, oil production, and consumption, are jointly determined as outcomes of the optimizing decisions of oil importers and oil exporters. On the supply side the oil market is modelled as a dominant firm – Saudi Aramco – with competitive fringe. We establish that a dominant firm may exist as long as it enjoys a cost advantage over the fringe. We provide an expression for the optimal markup and compute the spare capacity maintained by such a firm. The model produces plausible dynamics in response to oil supply and oil demand shocks. In particular, it reproduces successfully the jump in oil output of Saudi Aramco following the output collapse of Iraq and Kuwait during the first Gulf War, explaining it as the profit-maximizing response of the dominant firm. Oil taxes and subsidies affect the oil price and welfare through their effect on the trade-off between oil production efficiency and oil market competition.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Litzenberger, Robert H & Rabinowitz, Nir, 1995. " Backwardation in Oil Futures Markets: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1517-45, December.
- Salant, Stephen W, 1976. "Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 1079-93, October.
- Task Force of the Monetary Policy Committee of the ESCB, 2010. "Energy markets and the euro area macroeconomy," Occasional Paper Series 113, European Central Bank.
- Backus, David K. & Crucini, Mario J., 2000.
"Oil prices and the terms of trade,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 185-213, February.
- Sylvain Leduc & Keith Sill, 2006.
"Monetary policy, oil shocks, and TFP: accounting for the decline in U.S. volatility,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
873, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Sylvain Leduc & Keith Sill, 2007. "Monetary Policy, Oil Shocks, and TFP: Accounting for the Decline in U.S. Volatility," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(4), pages 595-614, October.
- Sylvain Leduc & Keith Sill, 2003. "Monetary policy, oil shocks, and TFP: accounting for the decline in U.S. volatility," Working Papers 03-22, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Lutz Kilian, 2009.
"Not All Oil Price Shocks Are Alike: Disentangling Demand and Supply Shocks in the Crude Oil Market,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 1053-69, June.
- Kilian, Lutz, 2006. "Not All Oil Price Shocks Are Alike: Disentangling Demand and Supply Shocks in the Crude Oil Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 5994, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Robert Barsky & Lutz Kilian, 2004.
"Oil and the Macroeconomy Since the 1970s,"
NBER Working Papers
10855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert B. Barsky & Lutz Kilian, 2001.
"Do We Really Know that Oil Caused the Great Stagflation? A Monetary Alternative,"
NBER Working Papers
8389, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert B. Barsky & Lutz Kilian, 2002. "Do We Really Know that Oil Caused the Great Stagflation? A Monetary Alternative," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2001, Volume 16, pages 137-198 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Leduc, Sylvain & Sill, Keith, 2004.
"A quantitative analysis of oil-price shocks, systematic monetary policy, and economic downturns,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 781-808, May.
- Sylvain Leduc & Keith Sill, 2001. "A quantitative analysis of oil-price shocks, systematic monetary policy, and economic downturns," Working Papers 01-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Pedro A. Almoguera & Christopher C. Douglas & Ana María Herrera, 2011. "Testing for the cartel in OPEC: non-cooperative collusion or just non-cooperative?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 144-168, Spring.
- Alhajji, A. F. & Huettner, David, 2000. "OPEC and other commodity cartels: a comparison," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(15), pages 1151-1164, December.
- Kim, In-Moo & Loungani, Prakash, 1992.
"The role of energy in real business cycle models,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 173-189, April.
- M. A. Adelman, 1986. "The Competitive Floor to World Oil Prices," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 9-31.
- James L. Smith, 2009.
"World Oil: Market or Mayhem?,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 145-64, Summer.
- Lutz Kilian, 2008.
"The Economic Effects of Energy Price Shocks,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 871-909, December.
- Anton Nakov & Andrea Pescatori, 2010. "Monetary Policy Trade-Offs with a Dominant Oil Producer," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(1), pages 1-32, 02.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bde:wpaper:1125. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mar�a Beiro. Electronic Dissemination of Information Unit. Research Department. Banco de Espa�a)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.