House purchase versus rental in Spain
One of the most salient feature of the Spanish housing market, compared to other European economies, is its relatively low rental share. This may be partly attributed to the existence of fiscal distortions in Spain favoring ownership. In this paper, we simulate the potential efects of different policy measures aimed at homogenizing the fiscal treatment of ownership and renting and improving the efficiency of the rental market. We do so in the context of a DSGE model featuring a market for owner-occupied and rented housing, as well as collateral constraints in loan markets. We find that eliminating the existing subsidy to house purchases, introducing a comparable subsidy to rental payments or increasing the efficiency in the production of housing rental services raise the rental share by a similar amount. However, their implications in terms of the construction sector differ.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2011|
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- Matteo Iacoviello & Stefano Neri, 2007.
"Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model,"
Boston College Working Papers in Economics
659, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 23 Oct 2009.
- Matteo Iacoviello & Stefano Neri, 2010. "Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 125-164, April.
- Matteo Iacoviello & Stefano Neri, 2008. "Housing market spillovers : evidence from an estimated DSGE model," Working Paper Research 145, National Bank of Belgium.
- Matteo Iacoviello & Stefano Neri, 2008. "Housing market spillovers: Evidence from an estimated DSGE model," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 659, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Javier Andrés & Óscar Arce & Carlos Thomas, 2010.
"Banking competition, collateral constraints and optimal monetary policy,"
1001, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
- Javier Andrés & Óscar Arce & Carlos Thomas, 2013. "Banking Competition, Collateral Constraints, and Optimal Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(s2), pages 87-125, December.
- Pablo Casas-Arce & Albert Saiz, 2010. "Owning versus Renting: Do Courts Matter?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 137-165, 02.
- José Manuel Marqués & Luis Ángel Maza & Margarita Rubio, 2010. "Una comparación de los ciclos inmobiliarios recientes en España, Estados Unidos y Reino Unido," Boletín Económico, Banco de España;Boletín Económico Homepage, issue JAN, Enero.
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