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From Pluralistic Ignorance to Common Knowledge with Social Assurance Contracts

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  • Matthew Cashman

Abstract

Societies and organizations often fail to surface latent consensus because individuals fear social censure. A manager might suspect a silent majority would offer a criticism, support a change, report a risk, or endorse a policy -- if only it were safe. Likewise, individuals with beliefs they think are rare and controversial might stay quiet for fear of consequences at work or an online mob. In both cases pluralistic ignorance produces a public discourse misaligned with privately-held beliefs. Social assurance contracts unlock latent consensus, making the public discussion more accurately reflect the underlying distribution of actual beliefs. They are akin to an open letter that publishes only when a stated threshold number of private signatures is reached. If it is not reached, nothing is revealed and no one is exposed. Whereas a single hand raised in dissent might get cut off, a thousand can be raised safely together. I build a formal model and derive rules for choosing the threshold. The mechanism (i) induces participation from those willing to speak if assured of company, resolving the core coordination problem in pluralistic ignorance; (ii) makes the threshold a transparent policy lever -- sponsors can maximize success, maximize public-coalition revelation, or hit a desired success probability; and (iii) turns success into information: meeting the threshold publicly reveals hidden agreement and can widen the range of views that can be expressed in public. I consider robustness to mistrust, organized opposition, and network structure, and outline low-trust implementations like cryptographic escrow. Applications include employee voice, safety and compliance, whistleblowing, and civic expression.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Cashman, 2026. "From Pluralistic Ignorance to Common Knowledge with Social Assurance Contracts," Papers 2604.00874, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2604.00874
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