Tailoring Bank Capital Regulation for Tail Risk
The experience of the 2007-09 financial crisis has showed that the bank capital regulation in place was inadequate to deal with "manufacturing" tail risk in the financial sector. This paper proposes an incentive-based design of bank capital regulation aimed at efficiently dealing with tail risk engendered by bank top managers. It has two specific features: (i) first, it incorporates information on the optimal incentive contract between bank shareholders and bank managers, thereby dealing with the internal agency problem; (ii) second, it relies on the mechanism of mandatory recapitalization to ensure this contract is adopted by bank shareholders.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2013|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en|
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