In this paper, we suggest that inefficiency may be an indirect, on-the-job compensation to agents in an organization. We show how to use actual production data to reveal the trade-offs between different inefficiencies (slacks). Moreover, we discuss how to use this to improve productivity analysis as well as decision making and incentive provisions in organizations.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.foi.life.ku.dk/|
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