IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jindec/v43y1995i3p301-21.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Privatisation and X-Inefficiency: A Bargaining Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Haskel, Jonathan
  • Sanchis, Amparo

Abstract

The usual analysis of privatization and X-inefficiency uses agency theory to model managerial effort. The authors model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers. Workers dislike effort because it lowers utility. Firms prefer high effort because it raises productivity. Public sector firms are assumed to be social welfare maximizers and therefore, compared to private sector firms, they bargain lower effort levels since they have the interests of consumers and workers at heart. The authors' model predicts that, under certain conditions, privatization should raise effort and so lower X-inefficiency, and that wages may increase or decrease. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Haskel, Jonathan & Sanchis, Amparo, 1995. "Privatisation and X-Inefficiency: A Bargaining Approach," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 301-321, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:43:y:1995:i:3:p:301-21
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1821%28199509%2943%3A3%3C301%3APAXABA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2&origin=bc
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:43:y:1995:i:3:p:301-21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.