The Contract Choice of Retailers in Hungarian Beef Sector
We present an empirical analysis about the contract choice of retailers in the Hungarian beef sector employing transaction cost economics. The frequency of transactions has negative influences on the duration of contract. Furthermore, large retailers are unlikely to have long term contract. We found some evidence that reputation reduces the probability of long term contract. Our results suggest that asset specificity has no influence on the duration of contract. In terms of specific aspect of contracts we find that price incentives in the form of bonus/penalty payments clauses are more likely to be incorporated in a contract of small firms.
|Date of creation:||2006|
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