IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/eaa123/122556.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the interaction between risk-taking and risk-sharing under farm household wealth heterogeneity

Author

Listed:
  • Delpierre, Matthieu
  • Verheyden, Bertrand
  • Weynants, Stephanie

Abstract

Empirical evidence on developing countries shows on the one hand that rich farm-households are more keen to adopt new technologies and are higher risk takers than poor households. On the other hand, however, they are shown to be less vulnerable to income shocks than poor farmers. This paper provides a rationale for these observations. Risk averse agents, heterogeneously endowed with wealth, non-cooperatively decide on their level of subscription to risk-sharing and on the degree of individual production risk they take. Rich households take more risks and subscribe more to risk-sharing. Although risk-sharing allows all households to cope with idiosyncratic shocks, the risk-taking behavior of rich households increases the covariate component of poor households' income variance through risk-sharing, deterring the participation of the poor. These poor households in turn opt for safer but less productive production plans.

Suggested Citation

  • Delpierre, Matthieu & Verheyden, Bertrand & Weynants, Stephanie, 2012. "On the interaction between risk-taking and risk-sharing under farm household wealth heterogeneity," 123rd Seminar, February 23-24, 2012, Dublin, Ireland 122556, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:eaa123:122556
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/122556
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hans Hoogeveen, 2002. "Evidence on Informal Insurance in Rural Zimabwe," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 11(2), pages 249-278, June.
    2. De Weerdt, Joachim & Dercon, Stefan, 2006. "Risk-sharing networks and insurance against illness," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 337-356, December.
    3. Coate, Stephen & Ravallion, Martin, 1993. "Reciprocity without commitment : Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 1-24, February.
    4. Dercon, Stefan & Christiaensen, Luc, 2011. "Consumption risk, technology adoption and poverty traps: Evidence from Ethiopia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 159-173, November.
    5. Dercon, Stefan, 1996. "Risk, Crop Choice, and Savings: Evidence from Tanzania," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(3), pages 485-513, April.
    6. Fafchamps, Marcel & Lund, Susan, 2003. "Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 261-287, August.
    7. Townsend, Robert M, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 539-591.
    8. Dercon, Stefan, 1998. "Wealth, risk and activity choice: cattle in Western Tanzania," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-42, February.
    9. Jonathan Morduch, 1995. "Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 103-114, Summer.
    10. Jonathan P. Thomas & Timothy Worrall, 2002. "Gift-giving, Quasi-credit and Reciprocity," Rationality and Society, , pages 308-352.
    11. Oriana Bandiera & Imran Rasul, 2006. "Social Networks and Technology Adoption in Northern Mozambique," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 869-902, October.
    12. Richard Akresh, 2009. "Flexibility of Household Structure: Child Fostering Decisions in Burkina Faso," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 44(4).
    13. Ethan Ligon & Jonathan P. Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2002. "Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 209-244.
    14. Kazianga, Harounan & Udry, Christopher, 2006. "Consumption smoothing? Livestock, insurance and drought in rural Burkina Faso," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 413-446.
    15. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4372 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Garance Genicot & Debraj Ray, 2003. "Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 87-113.
    17. Kurosaki, Takashi & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2002. "Insurance market efficiency and crop choices in Pakistan," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 419-453.
    18. Beegle, Kathleen & Dehejia, Rajeev H. & Gatti, Roberta & Krutikova, Sofya, 2008. "The consequences of child labor : evidence from longitudinal data in rural Tanzania," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4677, The World Bank.
    19. Hanan G. Jacoby & Emmanuel Skoufias, 1997. "Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital in a Developing Country," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 311-335.
    20. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 1996. "Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(4), pages 595-609.
    21. Flore Gubert & Anne-Sophie Robilliard, 2008. "Risk and Schooling Decisions in Rural Madagascar: A Panel Data-Analysis," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 17(2), pages 207-238, March.
    22. Jalan, Jyotsna & Ravallion, Martin, 1999. "Are the poor less well insured? Evidence on vulnerability to income risk in rural China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 61-81, February.
    23. Stefan Dercon, 2002. "Income Risk, Coping Strategies, and Safety Nets," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 17(2), pages 141-166, September.
    24. Sarpong, Daniel Bruce & Asuming-Brempong, Samuel, 2004. "Responding to Economic Shocks in Ghana: The Agricultural Sector as a Social Safety Net," eJADE: electronic Journal of Agricultural and Development Economics, Food and Agriculture Organization, Agricultural and Development Economics Division, vol. 1(1).
    25. Manuela Angelucci & Giacomo de Giorgi & Imran Rasul & Marcos A. Rangel, 2010. "Insurance and Investment within Family Networks," Working Papers id:2649, eSocialSciences.
    26. Murgai, Rinku & Winters, Paul & Sadoulet, Elisabeth & Janvry, Alain de, 2002. "Localized and incomplete mutual insurance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 245-274.
    27. Verpoorten, Marijke, 2009. "Household coping in war- and peacetime: Cattle sales in Rwanda, 1991-2001," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 67-86, January.
    28. Christopher Udry, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in Northern Nigeria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(3), pages 495-526.
    29. John McPeak, 2004. "Contrasting income shocks with asset shocks: livestock sales in northern Kenya," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 263-284, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Risk-taking; risk-sharing; technology adoption; farm household; International Development; Risk and Uncertainty; O12; O13; O17; O33;

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:eaa123:122556. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/eaaeeea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.