Contract enforcement in Hungarian agri-food chain: the case of small and medium enterprises
The paper analyses small and medium firms’ perceptions on contract enforcement along food chain in central region of Hungary using survey data. We find that 59 per cent of respondents believe that they could use court to enforce contracts with their partner. However we do not find significant differences along food chain. Our estimations suggest that contractual specificity and firm attributes, external linkages, efficiency of legal systems factors, buyer and seller specific factors significantly influence the opinion on contract enforcement. Interestingly, the impact of branch specific characteristics has no impacts. Acceptance of financial loss can be explained by contractual specificity, external linkages, and efficiency of legal systems. Buyer, seller and industry characteristics has not played role in the explanation of financial losses.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.aes.ac.uk/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Beckmann, Volker & Boger, Silke, 2003.
"Courts And Contract Enforcement In Transition Agriculture: Theory And Evidence From Poland,"
2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa
25878, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Beckmann, Volker & Boger, Silke, 2004. "Courts and contract enforcement in transition agriculture: theory and evidence from Poland," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 31(2-3), pages 251-263, December.
- Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
- Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990.
"Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
- Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Kristine Van Herck & Nivelin Noev & Johan F.M. Swinnen, 2012. "Institutions, exchange and firm growth: evidence from Bulgarian agriculture," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 39(1), pages 29-50, February.
- Jema Haji, 2010. "The Enforcement of Traditional Vegetable Marketing Contracts in the Eastern and Central Parts of Ethiopia," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 19(5), pages 768-792, November.
- Azeta Cungu & Hamish Gow & Johan F. M. Swinnen & Liesbet Vranken, 2008. "Investment with weak contract enforcement: evidence from Hungary during transition," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 35(1), pages 75-91, March.
- Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-41, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aesc12:134956. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.