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Agri-environmental Regulation on the Back of a Data Envelopment Analysis

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  • White, Benedict
  • Raguragavan, Jananee
  • Chambers, Robert G.

Abstract

A land retirement policy whereby land is taken out of agriculture and converted to natural vegetation or forestry has the potential to reduce environmental damage related to dryland salinity in Western Australia. This paper uses some recent results in the theory of directional distance functions (Chambers and Fare, 2004) to analyse alternative policy designs for a land retirement scheme. The results indicate that a fixed price scheme is inefficient compared with a first-best solution, but performs adequately. A scheme requiring a fixed proportion of area retired by all producers is inefficient. A separating solution, based on mechanism design, gives a small but significant increase in welfare compared to a fixed price scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • White, Benedict & Raguragavan, Jananee & Chambers, Robert G., 2007. "Agri-environmental Regulation on the Back of a Data Envelopment Analysis," 81st Annual Conference, April 2-4, 2007, Reading University, UK 7963, Agricultural Economics Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aes007:7963
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.7963
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Jayet, Pierre-Alain & Picard, Pierre, 1995. "An incentive approach to land set-aside programs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 1487-1509, October.
    2. Andrew Moxey & Ben White & Adam Ozanne, 1999. "Efficient Contract Design for Agri‐Environment Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 187-202, May.
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    4. Lau, Lawrence J & Yotopoulos, Pan A, 1971. "A Test for Relative Efficiency and Application to Indian Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 94-109, March.
    5. Philippe Bontems & Gilles Rotillon & Nadine Turpin, 2005. "Self-Selecting Agri-environmental Policieswith an Application to the Don Watershed," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(3), pages 275-301, July.
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    7. Chambers, Robert G, 1989. "Recent Developments in Production Economics," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 65(190), pages 243-264, September.
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