IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/aare04/58703.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Dryland salinity, coordinating action and economic policy: a role for contracts?

Author

Listed:
  • Harvey, Sallyann

Abstract

The problem of addressing dryland salinity at a landscape is considered in the context of using economic incentives to encourage change in land use by individual landholders to adopt salinity mitigating actions where a public asset of significant value is threatened. This paper reviews the principal-agent problem and looks at mechanisms which give incentives to address natural resource management problems, and in particular, the role of contracts between the Government and the landholders for achieving environmental objectives. Consideration is then given to the potential for empirical analysis of these policies in practice and their effectiveness in achieving the desired environmental outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Harvey, Sallyann, 2004. "Dryland salinity, coordinating action and economic policy: a role for contracts?," 2004 Conference (48th), February 11-13, 2004, Melbourne, Australia 58703, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aare04:58703
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/58703/files/2004_harvey.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrew Moxey & Ben White & Adam Ozanne, 1999. "Efficient Contract Design for Agri-Environment Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 187-202.
    2. Bystrom, Olof & Bromley, Daniel W., 1998. "Contracting For Nonpoint-Source Pollution Abatement," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 1-19, July.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/12331 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Krawczyk, Jacek B. & Lifran, Robert & Tidball, Mabel, 2005. "Use of coupled incentives to improve adoption of environmentally friendly technologies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 311-329, March.
    5. JunJie Wu & Bruce A. Babcock, 1996. "Contract Design for the Purchase of Environmental Goods from Agriculture," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(4), pages 935-945.
    6. Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Jayet, Pierre-Alain & Picard, Pierre, 1995. "An incentive approach to land set-aside programs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 1487-1509, October.
    7. Parkhurst, Gregory M. & Shogren, Jason F. & Bastian, Chris & Kivi, Paul & Donner, Jennifer & Smith, Rodney B. W., 2002. "Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 305-328, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aare04:58703. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aaresea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.