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Strategic Trade Policies in the U.S. Orange Juice Market: Competition between Florida and São Paulo

Author

Listed:
  • Luckstead, Jeff
  • Devadoss, Stephen
  • Mittelhammer, Ron C.

Abstract

The U.S. frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) market is dominated by a small number of processors in Florida and São Paulo (Brazil), while the European FCOJ market is dominated by São Paulo FCOJ processors. Both the U.S. and European governments impose a tariff on FCOJ imports. We develop a strategic trade model to analyze the oligopolistic competition between Florida and São Paulo processors in the U.S. FCOJ market and São Paulo processors in the European FCOJ market. We analyze the effect of a change in the U.S. and European tariff on FCOJ sales and welfare. The analytical results show that a reduction in the U.S. tariff increases São Paulo's exports to the United States while decreasing their exports to Europe, which causes a decrease in Florida's sales in the United States. The results of a reduction in the European tariff indicate that São Paulo diverts its exports from the United Sates to Europe, which augments Florida's sales in the United States. Based on the strategic trade model, the structural empirical model is derived and the New Empirical Industrial Organization literature is implemented to estimate the econometric model and compute the market power of Florida and São Paulo producers. The Lerner Index calculation suggests that both Florida and São Paulo processors exert market power, but São Paulo have a higher markup over their marginal costs because of lower input costs. The parameterized model is used to simulate a 25% reduction in both the U.S. and European tariffs. A 25% reduction in the U.S. tariff results in an 8% decrease in Florida's market share and a 27% increase in São Paulo's market share in the U.S. FCOJ market. While a 25% reduction in the European tariff causes Florida's U.S. market share to increase by 2% and São Paulo's U.S. market share to reduce by 6%. The simulation results are consistent with the analytical results.

Suggested Citation

  • Luckstead, Jeff & Devadoss, Stephen & Mittelhammer, Ron C., 2013. "Strategic Trade Policies in the U.S. Orange Juice Market: Competition between Florida and São Paulo," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 149668, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea13:149668
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.149668
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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