IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ags/aaea13/149582.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Optimal Generic Advertising under Bilateral Imperfect Competition between Processors and Retailers

Author

Listed:
  • Chung, Chanjin
  • Eom, Young Sook
  • Yang, Byung Woo
  • Han, Sungill

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of bilateral imperfect competition between processors and retailers and of import supply on optimal advertising intensity, advertising expenditures, and checkoff assessment rates. First, comparative static analyses were conducted on the newly developed optimal advertising intensity formula. Second, to consider the endogenous nature of optimal advertising, a linear market equilibrium model was developed and applied to the U.S. beef industry. Results showed that the full consideration of retailer-processor bilateral market power lowered the optimal values of assessment rates, advertising expenditures, and advertising intensity for the checkoff board while consideration of importers increases the optimal values. The results indicate that ignoring the import sector in optimal generic advertising modeling should underestimate these optimal values, while ignoring the bilateral market power between processors and retailers overestimates the values.

Suggested Citation

  • Chung, Chanjin & Eom, Young Sook & Yang, Byung Woo & Han, Sungill, 2013. "Optimal Generic Advertising under Bilateral Imperfect Competition between Processors and Retailers," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 149582, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea13:149582
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/149582
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mingxia Zhang & Richard J. Sexton, 2002. "Optimal Commodity Promotion when Downstream Markets are Imperfectly Competitive," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(2), pages 352-365.
    2. Chanjin Chung & Emílio Tostão, 2012. "Effects of horizontal consolidation under bilateral imperfect competition between processors and retailers," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(26), pages 3379-3389, September.
    3. Kinnucan, Henry W., 2003. "Optimal generic advertising in an imperfectly competitive food industry with variable proportions," Agricultural Economics of Agricultural Economists, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 29(2), October.
    4. George C. Davis & Maria Cristina Espinoza, 1998. "A Unified Approach to Sensitivity Analysis in Equilibrium Displacement Models," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(4), pages 868-879.
    5. Sofia Berto Villas-Boas, 2007. "Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 625-652.
    6. Kinnucan, Henry W & Myrland, Oystein, 2000. "Optimal Advertising Levies with Application to the Norway-EU Salmon Agreement," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 27(1), pages 39-57, March.
    7. Digal, Larry N. & Ahmadi-Esfahani, Fredoun Z., 2002. "Market power analysis in the retail food industry: a survey of methods," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 46(4), December.
    8. Chanjin Chung & Emílio Tostão, 2009. "Nonparametric Estimation of Oligopsony Power in First-Price Auction," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 318-333.
    9. Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1984. "Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 63-81.
    10. William Griffiths & Xueyan Zhao, 2000. "A Unified Approach to Sensitivity Analysis in Equilibrium Displacement Models: Comment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 82(1), pages 236-240.
    11. Brester, Gary W & Wohlgenant, Michael K, 1993. "Correcting for Measurement Error in Food Demand Estimation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(2), pages 352-356, May.
    12. Rigoberto Lopez & Azzeddine Azzam & Carmen Lirón-España, 2002. "Market Power and/or Efficiency: A Structural Approach," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 20(2), pages 115-126, March.
    13. Nelson, Philip, 1974. "Advertising as Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(4), pages 729-754, July/Aug..
    14. Greg Shaffer, 1991. "Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 120-135, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maes, Dries & Vancauteren, Mark & Van Passel, Steven, 2016. "Investigating market power in the Belgian pork production chain," 149th Seminar, October 27-28, 2016, Rennes, France 245114, European Association of Agricultural Economists.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    bilateral market power; checkoff; import supply; oligopoly; oligopsony; optimal advertising; processor; retailer; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Consumer/Household Economics; Industrial Organization; Marketing; L13; L66; M37;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L66 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco
    • M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:aaea13:149582. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aaeaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.