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A Simple Model Of Voluntary Vs Mandatory Labelling Of Gmos

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  • Kirchhoff, Stefanie
  • Zago, Angelo M.

Abstract

We consider the welfare impact of the mandatory and voluntary labelling to inform consumers on GMOs content in foods. With a model of vertical differentiation in competitive markets, we evaluate the effects on price equilibrium and welfare levels. We find that the mandatory labelling scheme would be optimal in those countries with more GMO-averse consumers and no-GMOs practices producers. Voluntary labelling would instead optimally be chosen in those countries where producers are using GMOs and consumers are more concerned about the costs savings resulting in this technology adoption.

Suggested Citation

  • Kirchhoff, Stefanie & Zago, Angelo M., 2001. "A Simple Model Of Voluntary Vs Mandatory Labelling Of Gmos," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20540, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea01:20540
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20540
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Julie A. Caswell & Eliza M. Mojduszka, 1996. "Using Informational Labeling to Influence the Market for Quality in Food Products," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1248-1253.
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    Cited by:

    1. Huffman, Wallace E. & Rousu, Matthew C. & Shogren, Jason F. & Tegene, Abebayehu, 2002. "Should The United States Initiate A Mandatory Labeling Policy For Genetically Modified Foods?," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19857, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    2. Bansal, Sangeeta & Chakravarty, Sujoy & Ramaswami, Bharat, 2013. "The informational and signaling impacts of labels: experimental evidence from India on GM foods," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(6), pages 701-722, December.
    3. Huffman, Wallace E. & Rousu, Matthew C. & Shogren, Jason F. & Tegene, Abebayehu, 2002. "Should The United States Regulate Mandatory Labeling For Genetically Modified Foods?," Working Papers 18215, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. Guillaume P. Gruère & Colin A. Carter & Y. Hossein Farzin, 2008. "What labelling policy for consumer choice? The case of genetically modified food in Canada and Europe," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1472-1497, November.
    5. Aerni, Philipp & Scholderer, Joachim & Ermen, David, 2011. "How would Swiss consumers decide if they had freedom of choice? Evidence from a field study with organic, conventional and GM corn bread," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 830-838.
    6. Sangeeta Bansal & Sujoy Chakravarty & Bharat Ramaswami, "undated". "Weak Aversion to GM Foods: Experimental Evidence from India," Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Discussion Papers 10-02, Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
    7. Soham Baksi & Pinaki Bose, 2007. "Credence Goods, Efficient Labelling Policies, and Regulatory Enforcement," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 37(2), pages 411-430, June.
    8. Castellari, Elena & Soregaroli, Claudio & Venus, Thomas J. & Wesseler, Justus, 2018. "Food processor and retailer non-GMO standards in the US and EU and the driving role of regulations," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 26-37.
    9. Andy Thorpe & Catherine Robinson, 2004. "When goliaths clash: US and EU differences over the labeling of food products derived from genetically modified organisms," Agriculture and Human Values, Springer;The Agriculture, Food, & Human Values Society (AFHVS), vol. 21(4), pages 287-298, January.
    10. Colson, Gregory, 2009. "Improving nutrient content through genetic modification: Evidence from experimental auctions on consumer acceptance and willingness to pay for intragenic foods," ISU General Staff Papers 200901010800001872, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

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