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Franchising

In: The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics

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  • Steven C. Michael

Abstract

Since its emergence in the 1970s, transaction cost economics (TCE) has become a leading approach in the research on contracts, firm organization and strategy, antitrust, marketing, inter-firm collaboration and entrepreneurship. With contributions by leading scholars in economics, law and business administration – including Oliver E. Williamson, recipient of the 2009 Nobel Prize in economics for his development of the transaction cost approach – this volume reviews the latest developments in TCE and applies them to contemporary theoretical and empirical problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven C. Michael, 2010. "Franchising," Chapters, in: Peter G. Klein & Michael E. Sykuta (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Transaction Cost Economics, chapter 19, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:4136_19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael, Steven C. & Moore, Hollie J., 1995. "Returns to franchising," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(1-2), pages 133-155, October.
    2. Brickley, James A. & Dark, Frederick H., 1987. "The choice of organizational form The case of franchising," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 401-420, June.
    3. Lafontaine, Francine, 1999. "Franchising versus corporate ownership: The effect on price dispersion," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 17-34, January.
    4. Gallini, Nancy T & Lutz, Nancy A, 1992. "Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(3), pages 471-501, October.
    5. Blair,Roger D. & Lafontaine,Francine, 2011. "The Economics of Franchising," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521775892, January.
    6. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, 1997. "Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 1-25, March.
    7. Karin Fladmoe-Lindquist & Laurent L. Jacque, 1995. "Control Modes in International Service Operations: The Propensity to Franchise," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(7), pages 1238-1249, July.
    8. Mick Carney & Eric Gedajlovic, 1991. "Vertical integration in Franchise systems: Agency theory and resource explanations," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(8), pages 607-629, November.
    9. Scott Shane & Maw-Der Foo, 1999. "New Firm Survival: Institutional Explanations for New Franchisor Mortality," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(2), pages 142-159, February.
    10. Francine Lafontaine, 1992. "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 263-283, Summer.
    11. Scott Shane, 2001. "Organizational Incentives and Organizational Mortality," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(2), pages 136-160, April.
    12. Rubin, Paul H, 1978. "The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 223-233, April.
    13. Michael, Steven C., 2000. "The effect of organizational form on quality: the case of franchising," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 295-318, November.
    14. Brickley, James A & Dark, Frederick H & Weisbach, Michael S, 1991. "The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 101-132, April.
    15. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
    16. Minkler, Alanson P., 1990. "An empirical analysis of a firm's decision to franchise," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 77-82, September.
    17. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    18. Klein, Benjamin, 1995. "The economics of franchise contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(1-2), pages 9-37, October.
    19. Seth W. Norton, 1988. "Franchising, brand name capital, and the entrepreneurial capacity problem," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(S1), pages 105-114, June.
    20. Steven C. Michael, 2000. "Investments to create bargaining power: the case of franchising," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 497-514, April.
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