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Cagatay Kayi
(Çağatay Kayı)

Personal Details

First Name:Cagatay
Middle Name:
Last Name:Kayi
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pka418
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/view/cagataykayi/home
Universidad del Rosario Faculty of Economics ​Calle 12C No 4-59 Casa Pedro Fermín 314 Bogotá – Colombia
+57 1 2970200 Ext: 4138
Terminal Degree:2007 Economics Department; University of Rochester (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Facultad de Economía
Universidad del Rosario

Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia
http://www.urosario.edu.co/facultad-economia/inicio/

:


RePEc:edi:ferosco (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn, 2017. "School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms," Working Papers 957, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn, 2017. "Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems," Working Papers 956, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  3. Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn, 2013. "Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare," Working Papers 686, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  4. Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn, 2012. "On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Working Papers 632, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Paula Jaramillo & Cagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn, 2012. "Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint," Documentos de Trabajo 009381, Universidad del Rosario.
  6. Rahmi Ilkilic, 2012. "Allocation rules on networks," Documentos de Trabajo 009380, Universidad del Rosario.
  7. RAMAEKERS, Eve & KAYI, Cagatay, 2008. "Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2008084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Chun Youngsub & Kayi Çağatay & Yeh Chun-Hsien, 2008. "Consistency and the sequential equal contributions rule for airport problems," Research Memorandum 039, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  9. Kayi Çağatay & Ramaekers Eve, 2008. "An Impossibility in Sequencing Problems," Research Memorandum 040, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

Articles

  1. Paula Jaramillo & Çaǧatay Kayı & Flip Klijn, 2019. "The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 157-179, March.
  2. Rahmi İlkılıç & Çağatay Kayı, 2014. "Allocation rules on networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 877-892, December.
  3. Paula Jaramillo & Çaǧatay Kayı & Flip Klijn, 2014. "Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 603-633, October.
  4. Paula Jaramillo & Çaǧatay Kayı & Flip Klijn, 2014. "On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(4), pages 793-811, April.
  5. Jaramillo, Paula & Kayı, Çaǧatay & Klijn, Flip, 2013. "Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 693-701.
  6. KayI, Çagatay & Ramaekers, Eve, 2010. "Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 220-232, January.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn, 2013. "Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare," Working Papers 686, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2017. "The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer–seller markets when the agents play strategically," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(1), pages 99-119, June.
    2. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2016. "Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists," Working Papers 892, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    3. David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2017. "On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer–seller markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1137-1161, November.
    4. Tello Benjamín, 2018. "Stability of Equilibrium Outcomes under Deferred Acceptance: Acyclicity and Dropping Strategies," Working Papers 2018-05, Banco de México.
    5. Tello Benjamín, 2017. "Stability of Equilibrium Outcomes under Deferred Acceptance: Acyclicity and Dropping Strategies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(2), pages 1-9, June.

  2. Paula Jaramillo & Ça?atay Kay? & Flip Klijn, 2012. "On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets," Working Papers 632, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Klijn, Flip & Pais, Joana & Vorsatz, Marc, 2019. "Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 147-163.
    2. Klijn, Flip & Yazıcı, Ayşe, 2014. "A many-to-many ‘rural hospital theorem’," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 63-73.
    3. Jaramillo, Paula & Kayı, Çaǧatay & Klijn, Flip, 2013. "Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 693-701.

  3. Paula Jaramillo & Cagatay Kayi & Flip Klijn, 2012. "Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint," Documentos de Trabajo 009381, Universidad del Rosario.

    Cited by:

    1. Alfredo Valencia-Toledo & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2020. "A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 24(1), pages 65-99, June.
    2. Ana María Ibá-ez, 2014. "Growth in forced displacement: cross-country, sub-national and household evidence on potential determinants," Chapters, in: Robert E.B. Lucas (ed.),International Handbook on Migration and Economic Development, chapter 13, pages 350-387, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Alfredo Valencia-Toledo & Juan Vidal-Puga, 2020. "Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 173-193, March.
    4. Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo & Vidal-Puga, Juan, 2015. "Non-manipulable rules for land rental problems," MPRA Paper 67334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Andersson, Tommy & Ehlers, Lars & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2014. "Least manipulable Envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 43-49.
    6. ANDERSSON, Tommy & EHLERS, Lars & SVENSSON, Lars-Gunnar, 2012. "(Minimally) 'epsilon'-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche 2012-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
    7. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 2012. "(Minimally) ?-Incentive Compatible Competitive Equilibria in Economies with Indivisibilities," Cahiers de recherche 04-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    8. Arias María Alejandra & Ibáñez Ana María & Querubin Pablo, 2014. "The Desire to Return during Civil War: Evidence for Internally Displaced Populations in Colombia," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 209-233, January.

  4. Rahmi Ilkilic, 2012. "Allocation rules on networks," Documentos de Trabajo 009380, Universidad del Rosario.

    Cited by:

    1. Erik Ansink & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2012. "Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 187-210, February.
    2. Hervé Moulin & Jay Sethuraman, 2013. "The Bipartite Rationing Problem," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 61(5), pages 1087-1100, October.
    3. Ansink, Erik & Weikard, Hans-Peter, 2013. "Composition properties in the river claims problem," MPRA Paper 51618, University Library of Munich, Germany.

  5. RAMAEKERS, Eve & KAYI, Cagatay, 2008. "Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems," CORE Discussion Papers 2008084, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    Cited by:

    1. Anouar El Haji & Sander Onderstal, 2019. "Trading places: An experimental comparison of reallocation mechanisms for priority queuing," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 670-686, November.
    2. Duygu Yengin & Youngsub Chun, 2015. "Welfare Lower Bounds and Strategyproofness in the Queueing Problem," School of Economics Working Papers 2015-11, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
    3. Dominik Kress & Sebastian Meiswinkel & Erwin Pesch, 2018. "Mechanism design for machine scheduling problems: classification and literature overview," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 40(3), pages 583-611, July.
    4. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2017. "Reordering an existing queue," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(1), pages 65-87, June.
    5. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Hiroki Saitoh, 2012. "Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(3), pages 473-480, March.
    6. Chun, Youngsub & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mutuswami, Suresh, 2019. "Egalitarianism in the queueing problem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 48-56.
    7. Youngsup Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2013. "Egalitarian Equivalence and Strategyproofness in the Queueing Problem," Working Paper Series no89, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
    8. Bloch, Francis, 2017. "Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers:The role of random priorities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 73-79.
    9. Erwin Ooghe, 2019. "Markets, Queues, and Taxes," CESifo Working Paper Series 7910, CESifo.
    10. Duygu Yengin, 2017. "No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 81-108, January.
    11. Youngsub Chun & Manipushpak Mitra & Suresh Mutuswami, 2019. "Recent developments in the queueing problem," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 27(1), pages 1-23, April.
    12. Mitra, Manipushpak & De, Parikshit, 2015. "Incentives and justice for sequencing problems," MPRA Paper 65447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Chun, Youngsub & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mutuswami, Suresh, 2019. "A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 486-490.
    14. Chun, Youngsub & Mitra, Manipushpak, 2014. "Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 238(1), pages 281-289.
    15. Chun, Youngsub & Mitra, Manipushpak & Mutuswami, Suresh, 2014. "Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 62-66.

Articles

  1. Paula Jaramillo & Çaǧatay Kayı & Flip Klijn, 2019. "The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 157-179, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Christopher Kah & Flip Klijn & Markus Walzl, 2019. "Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core," Working Papers 1115, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.

  2. Rahmi İlkılıç & Çağatay Kayı, 2014. "Allocation rules on networks," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 877-892, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Paula Jaramillo & Çaǧatay Kayı & Flip Klijn, 2014. "Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 603-633, October.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Paula Jaramillo & Çaǧatay Kayı & Flip Klijn, 2014. "On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(4), pages 793-811, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Jaramillo, Paula & Kayı, Çaǧatay & Klijn, Flip, 2013. "Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 693-701.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. KayI, Çagatay & Ramaekers, Eve, 2010. "Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 220-232, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

Featured entries

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations or Wikipedia entries:
  1. Turkish Economists

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 13 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (13) 2008-11-18 2012-03-21 2012-03-21 2012-05-02 2012-05-15 2012-06-05 2012-10-06 2013-04-13 2013-05-22 2017-03-12 2017-03-19 2017-04-16 2017-04-16. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (5) 2012-03-21 2012-03-21 2012-05-02 2013-04-13 2013-05-22. Author is listed
  3. NEP-URE: Urban & Real Estate Economics (2) 2017-03-19 2017-04-16
  4. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2012-03-21
  5. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2012-03-21

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