No Growth without Equity? Inequality, Interests, and Competition in Mexico
In this introduction, the authors do three things. They first introduce the puzzle and relate it to existing interpretations from market reformists and their critics, arguing that both sets of views are inadequate. The authors then offer an alternative interpretation: that entrenched inequities sustained by a rent-sharing political equilibrium are a primary source of inefficiencies and weak growth. Moreover, this equilibrium has been resilient to democratization in ways that can be explained by the nature of the underlying forces. Finally, they draw some tentative implications for the future, suggesting how public action could potentially support a shift to more equitable and more efficient equilibrium. The volume's chapters are introduced within the structure of this argument.
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- Estache, Antonio & Rossi, Martin A., 2008.
"Regulatory agencies : impact on firm performance and social welfare,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
4509, The World Bank.
- Antonio Estache & Martin A. Rossi, 2009. "Regulatory Agencies: Impact on Firm Performance and Social Welfare," Working Papers ECARES 2009_010, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, September.
- Scott Wallsten, 2004. "Privatizing Monopolies in Developing Countries: The Real Effects of Exclusivity Periods in Telecommunications," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 303-320, 08. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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