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Regulated Expansion of Electricity Transmission Networks: The Effects of Fluctuating Demand and Wind Generation

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  • Wolf-Peter Schill
  • Juan Rosellón
  • Jonas Egerer

Abstract

We study the performance of different regulatory approaches for the expansion of electricity transmission networks in the light of realistic demand patterns and fluctuating wind power. In particular, we are interested in the relative performance of a combined merchant-regulatory mechanism compared to a cost-based and a merchant-like approach. In contrast to earlier research, we explicitly include both an hourly time resolution and fluctuating wind power, which allows representing demand in a very realistic way. This substantially increases the real-world applicability of results compared to previous analyses, which were based on simplifying assumptions. We show that a combined merchant-regulatory regulation, which draws on a cap over the two-part tariff of the Transco, leads to welfare outcomes far superior to the modeled alternatives. This result proves to be robust over a range of different cases and sensitivity analyses. We also find that the intertemporal rebalancing of the two-part tariff carried out by the Transco so as to expand the network is such that the fixed tariff part turns out to be relatively large compared to extension costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolf-Peter Schill & Juan Rosellón & Jonas Egerer, 2011. "Regulated Expansion of Electricity Transmission Networks: The Effects of Fluctuating Demand and Wind Generation," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1109, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1109
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Juan Rosellón & Hannes Weigt, 2011. "A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Transmission Expansion in Electricity Networks: Theory, Modeling, and Application," The Energy Journal, , vol. 32(1), pages 119-148, January.
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    7. Ingo Vogelsang, 2006. "Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-based Regulation," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 97-126.
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    Cited by:

    1. Egerer, Jonas & Rosellón, Juan & Schill, Wolf-Peter, 2015. "Power System Transformation toward Renewables: An Evaluation of Regulatory Approaches for Network Expansion," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 36(4), pages 105-128.
    2. Herrera, Luis Ángel & Rosellón, Juan, 2014. "On distributive effects of optimal regulation for power grid expansion," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 189-204.
    3. Jonas Egerer & Clemens Gerbaulet & Casimir Lorenz, 2013. "European Electricity Grid Infrastructure Expansion in a 2050 Context," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1299, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Electricity; Regulation; Transmission Expansion; Wind Power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q40 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly

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