IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

El modelo HRV para expansión óptima de redes de transmisión: una aplicación a la red eléctrica de Ontario
[The HRV Model for the Optimal Expansion of Transmission Networks: an Application to the Ontario Electricity Grid]

  • Rosellon, Juan
  • Tregear, Juan
  • Zenon, Eric

This paper presents an application of a mechanism that provides incentives to promote transmission network expansion in the electricity system of the Ontario province. Such a mechanism combines a merchant approach with a regulatory approach. It is based on the rebalancing of a two-part tariff within the framework of a wholesale electricity market with nodal pricing. The expansion of the network is carried out through auctions of financial transmission rights for congested links. The mechanism is tested for a simplified transmission grid with ten interconnected zones, ten nodes, eleven lines and seventy eight generators in the Ontario province. The simulation is carried out for both peak and non-peak scenarios. Considering Laspeyres weights, the results show that that prices converge to the marginal cost of generation, the congestion rent decreases, and the total social welfare increases.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26471/1/MPRA_paper_26471.pdf
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 26471.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:26471
Contact details of provider: Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Leautier, Thomas-Olivier, 2001. "Transmission Constraints and Imperfect Markets for Power," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 27-54, January.
  2. Makoto Tanaka, 2007. "Extended Price Cap Mechanism for Efficient Transmission Expansion under Nodal Pricing," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 257-275, September.
  3. Bushnell, James, 1999. "Transmission Rights and Market Power," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 12(8), pages 77-85, October.
  4. Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Merchant Transmission Investment," Working Papers 0304, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
  5. Juan Rosellon & Hannes Weigt, 2008. "A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Transmission Expansion in Electricity Networks–Theory, Modeling and Application," Working papers DTE 424, CIDE, División de Economía.
  6. Kristiansen, T. & Rosellón, J., 2010. "Merchant electricity transmission expansion: A European case study," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 4107-4115.
  7. Rosellon, Juan & Weigt, Hannes, 2008. "A Dynamic Incentive Mechanism for Transmission Expansion in Electricity Networks – Theory, Modeling and Application," MPRA Paper 22843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Hogan, William W, 2002. "Electricity Market Restructuring: Reforms of Reforms," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 103-32, January.
  9. Bushnell, James & Stoft, Steven, 1997. "Improving Private Incentives for Electric Grid Investment," Staff General Research Papers 31549, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  10. Richard Green, 2004. "Electricity Transmission Pricing: How much does it cost to get it wrong?," Working Papers 0420, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
  11. Ingo Vogelsang, 2005. "Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-Based Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1474, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Juan Rosellon & Hannes Weigt, 2007. "A Combined Merchant-Regulatory Mechanism for Electricity Transmission Expansion in Europe," Working papers DTE 396, CIDE, División de Economía.
  13. Bushnell, James B & Stoft, Steven E, 1996. "Electric Grid Investment under a Contract Network Regime," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 61-79, July.
  14. Anna Creti & Natalia Fabra, 2003. "Capacity Markets for Electricity," Industrial Organization 0309002, EconWPA, revised 26 Nov 2003.
  15. Vogelsang, Ingo, 2002. "Incentive Regulation and Competition in Public Utility Markets: A 20-Year Perspective," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 5-27, July.
  16. Rosellón Juan, 2003. "Different Approaches Towards Electricity Transmission Expansion," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-32, September.
  17. Robert Wilson, 2002. "Architecture of Power Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1299-1340, July.
  18. Hogan, William W, 1992. "Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 211-42, September.
  19. Chao, Hung-Po & Peck, Stephen, 1996. "A Market Mechanism for Electric Power Transmission," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 25-59, July.
  20. Vogelsang, Ingo, 2001. "Price Regulation for Independent Transmission Companies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 141-65, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:26471. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.