Electric Grid Investment under a Contract Network Regime
This paper analyzes the incentives for electric grid investment that result from various proposed transmission network property regimes. In particular, we focus on "transmission congestion contracts" within a contract network regime such as proposed by William Hogan. We formalize a rule for awarding these new property rights to investors and show that, under certain conditions, this contract network approach can effectively deter detrimental investments, some of which are encouraged under other regimes. However, when these conditions are not met, market participants may still find it profitable to undertake network alterations which are detrimental to the network as a whole. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:10:y:1996:i:1:p:61-79. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.