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Relational republican regulation

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  • John Braithwaite

Abstract

This response refutes point (i) in the Ayres comment's abstract. It argues that at its heart responsive regulation is about seeking strategies that will render regulation more relational when it counts. This is possible even in domains like tax compliance where 99 per cent of the routine regulatory action occurs without face‐to‐face encounter. A number of critiques in the special issue are embraced. While practitioners who reject civic republican values can learn from the responsive regulation literature, regulation conduces to tyranny if it is not explicit in a value commitment to reducing domination in the world. Concern that the republican elements of the argument have been insufficiently prominent in subsequent writing of the authors is therefore embraced. Freedom as non‐domination requires a transnational regulatory vision for strategies with transnational leverage that reduce domination globally, not just nationally. A paradox advanced is that the largest regulatory errors of recent history on the global stage are best corrected by micro relational strategies invented with a global imagination for crafting micro–macro linkages.

Suggested Citation

  • John Braithwaite, 2013. "Relational republican regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 124-144, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:reggov:v:7:y:2013:i:1:p:124-144
    DOI: 10.1111/rego.12004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Braithwaite, John, 2005. "Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195222012, Decembrie.
    2. Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, 1998. "Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(1), pages 43-77.
    3. John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai & Valerie Braithwaite, 2007. "Regulating Aged Care," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12540.
    4. Parker,Christine, 2002. "The Open Corporation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521818902.
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