Pricing by state-owned enterprises: the case of postal services
Sappington and Sidak develop a model of state-owned enterprise (SOE) pricing behavior in which firms maximize a weighted average of revenues and profits. The model predicts that SOEs will lower prices in more-elastic markets and raise them in less-elastic markets if the weight they place on profit is positive. The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 relaxed the institutional constraints on pricing by the US Postal Service, which allows a test of the Sappington-Sidak model. The model's predictions are broadly confirmed. Congress passed the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act in 2006, which may help address some anticompetitive concerns in this industry. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Volume (Year): 29 (2008)
Issue (Month): 7 ()
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- Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-977, December.
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- repec:aei:rpbook:53134 is not listed on IDEAS
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- David Sappington & J. Sidak, 2003. "Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 22(3), pages 183-206, May.
- Brennan, Timothy J, 1990. "Cross-Subsidization and Cost Misallocation by Regulated Monopolists," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 37-51, March.
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