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Costs and benefits through bureaucratic lenses: Example of a highway project

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  • Anthony Boardman
  • Aidan Vining
  • W. G. Waters

Abstract

This article characterizes the perceptions of government bureaucrats about cost-benefit analysis (CBA). The observations arise after working with government officials on various projects and leading many executive seminars for government employees over the last decade on the principles and practice of CBA. Government employees tend to adopt one of three conceptual lenses: Guardians, Spenders, and Analysts. These perspectives differ sharply from one another, resulting in completely different meanings to the words benefits and costs. The orientation of Guardians is to “revenue-expenditure” analysis, while Spenders are oriented to “constituency-support” analysis. Analysts are oriented to standard CBA. The differences in perspectives are illustrated using an ex ante CBA of a proposed toll highway project.

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony Boardman & Aidan Vining & W. G. Waters, 1993. "Costs and benefits through bureaucratic lenses: Example of a highway project," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(3), pages 532-555.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:12:y:1993:i:3:p:532-555
    DOI: 10.2307/3325305
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    Cited by:

    1. Jones, Philip & Cullis, John, 1996. "Legitimate and illegitimate transfers: Dealing with "political" cost-benefit analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 247-257, June.
    2. Kerry Krutilla, 2005. "Using the Kaldor-Hicks tableau format for cost-benefit analysis and policy evaluation," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(4), pages 864-875.
    3. de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne & Ross, Thomas W., 2009. "Public-private partnerships and the privatization of financing: An incomplete contracts approach," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 358-368, May.
    4. Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, 2010. "Assessing the Economic Worth of Public–Private Partnerships," Chapters, in: Graeme A. Hodge & Carsten Greve & Anthony E. Boardman (ed.), International Handbook on Public–Private Partnerships, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Aidan R. Vining, 2016. "What Is Public Agency Strategic Analysis (PASA) and How Does It Differ from Public Policy Analysis and Firm Strategy Analysis?," Administrative Sciences, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-31, December.

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