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Legitimate and illegitimate transfers: Dealing with "political" cost-benefit analysis

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  • Jones, Philip
  • Cullis, John

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  • Jones, Philip & Cullis, John, 1996. "Legitimate and illegitimate transfers: Dealing with "political" cost-benefit analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 247-257, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:2:p:247-257
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    4. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922.
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    8. John G. Cullis & Philip R. Jones, 1992. "Does It Make Sense To Double Count? Problems in Assessing Rent-Seeking Costs," Public Finance Review, , vol. 20(3), pages 378-389, July.
    9. Randall G. Holcombe, 1994. "The Economic Foundations of Government," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-13230-0.
    10. Anthony Boardman & Aidan Vining & W. G. Waters, 1993. "Costs and benefits through bureaucratic lenses: Example of a highway project," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(3), pages 532-555.
    11. Paul, Chris & Wilhite, Allen W, 1994. "Illegal Markets and the Social Costs of Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 105-115, April.
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    14. Lott, John R, Jr & Roberts, Russell D, 1989. "Why Comply: One-Sided Enforcement of Price Controls and Victimless Crime Laws," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 403-414, June.
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