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Is Tax Reform in the Public Interest? a Rent-Seeking Perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Xavier de Vanssay

    (York University)

  • Zane A. Spindler

    (Simon Fraser University)

Abstract

This article argues that rent-seeking competition over tax reform can exhaust prospective efficiency gains, thus making tax reform a potential negative-sum activity—especially when considered over the entire rent-seeking cycle. It concludes that a positive defense against negative-sum tax reform games can arise from public choice economists debunking the game's ideological basis and constructing "rent-seeking impact statements" for proposed tax reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Xavier de Vanssay & Zane A. Spindler, 1994. "Is Tax Reform in the Public Interest? a Rent-Seeking Perspective," Public Finance Review, , vol. 22(1), pages 3-21, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:22:y:1994:i:1:p:3-21
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219402200101
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Spindler, Zane A., 1990. "A rent-seeking perspective on privatization," North American Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 87-103.
    2. Zane Spindler & Michael Walker, 1988. "Canadian Tax Reform As Public Choice," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 6(4), pages 70-84, October.
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    5. Thomas Havrilesky, 1990. "A Public Choice Perspective on the Cycle in Monetary Policy," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 9(3), pages 709-718, Winter.
    6. von Hayek, Friedrich August, 1989. "The Pretence of Knowledge," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(6), pages 3-7, December.
    7. Thomas S. McCaleb, 1985. "Public Choice Perspectives on the Flat Tax Follies," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(2), pages 613-628, Fall.
    8. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    9. Aaron, Henry J, 1987. "Symposium on Tax Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 7-10, Summer.
    10. Godwin, R Kenneth, 1990. "Investments in Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 291-297, March.
    11. Beenstock, Michael, 1989. "A Democratic Model of the `Rent-Sought' Benefit Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 289, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Bob Hamilton & John Whalley, 1989. "Reforming Indirect Taxes in Canada: Some General Equilibrium Estimates," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(3), pages 561-575, August.
    13. Paul, Chris & Wilhite, Al, 1991. "Rent-Seeking, Rent-Defending, and Rent Dissipation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 71(1-2), pages 61-70, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jones, Philip & Cullis, John, 1996. "Legitimate and illegitimate transfers: Dealing with "political" cost-benefit analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 247-257, June.
    2. Berggren, Niclas, 2003. "The Frailty of Economic Reforms: Political Logic and Constitutional Lessons," Ratio Working Papers 1, The Ratio Institute.

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