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Optimal Regulation of Noncompete Contracts

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  • Liyan Shi

Abstract

I study regulation of noncompete employment contracts, assessing the trade‐off between restricting worker mobility and encouraging firm investment. I develop an on‐the‐job search model in which firms and workers sign dynamic wage contracts with noncompete clauses and firms invest in their workers' general human capital. Employers use noncompete clauses to enforce buyout payments when their workers depart, ultimately extracting rent from future employers. This rent extraction is socially excessive, and restrictions on these clauses can improve efficiency. The optimal regulation policy is characterized. In an application to the managerial labor market using a novel contract data set, I find the optimal policy to be quantitatively close to a ban.

Suggested Citation

  • Liyan Shi, 2023. "Optimal Regulation of Noncompete Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(2), pages 425-463, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:91:y:2023:i:2:p:425-463
    DOI: 10.3982/ECTA18128
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    Cited by:

    1. David W. Berger & Kyle F. Herkenhoff & Andreas R. Kostøl & Simon Mongey, 2023. "An Anatomy of Monopsony: Search Frictions, Amenities, and Bargaining in Concentrated Markets," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2023, volume 38, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Rasmus Lentz & Nicolas Roys, 2024. "Training and Search On the Job," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 53, pages 123-146, July.
    3. Amand, Marnix & Chéron, Arnaud & Pelgrin, Florian & Terriau, Anthony, 2023. "Soccer labour market equilibrium and efficient training of players," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).
    4. Arnaud Chéron & Anthony Terriau, 2023. "On-The-Job Search, Life-cycle Training, and the Role of Transfer Fees," TEPP Working Paper 2023-06, TEPP.
    5. Nicolas Bonneton & Christopher Sandmann, 2023. "Non-Stationary Search and Assortative Matching," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_465, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

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