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Economics at the FTC: Non-Horizontal Mergers, the CARS Rule, and the Non-Compete Rule

Author

Listed:
  • Alison Hole

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics)

  • Michael LeGower

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics)

  • Michael Lipsitz

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics)

  • Aviv Nevo

    (Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics)

Abstract

The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces federal competition and consumer protection laws that prevent anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices, and works to advance government policies that protect consumers and promote competition. The FTC’s Bureau of Economics performs economic analysis to support the enforcement, rulemaking and policy activities of the Commission. This article discusses several examples of these activities. We first discuss analysis of non-horizontal effects of mergers, as reflected in the 2023 Merger Guidelines and in recent cases. Next, we discuss the economic analysis conducted by the FTC’s economists in two recent rules. We discuss the CARS rule, a rule that aims to increase price transparency and curb misrepresentations in the marketing, sale, and leasing of motor vehicles. We next discuss the non-compete rule, which bans employers from entering into, or attempting to enter into, a non-compete clause with a worker.

Suggested Citation

  • Alison Hole & Michael LeGower & Michael Lipsitz & Aviv Nevo, 2024. "Economics at the FTC: Non-Horizontal Mergers, the CARS Rule, and the Non-Compete Rule," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(4), pages 933-965, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:65:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-024-10000-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-024-10000-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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