IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/ectrin/v32y2024i1p143-163.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Wrongful convictions with Chinese characteristics

Author

Listed:
  • Peiyuan Li
  • Wei Li

Abstract

This study examines the impact of an imbalanced judiciary on the generation and rectification of wrongful convictions in China. Specifically, we investigate the influence of the Political and Legal Affairs Commissions (PLACs), which are tasked by the Communist Party with controlling judicial authorities. By analyzing 335 cases of wrongful convictions between 1990 and 2010, we have identified a significant relationship between the appointment of PLAC secretaries as chiefs of police and an increase in wrongful convictions. This arrangement disrupts the checks within the judicial system, leading to the prosecution of an additional 251 individuals each year in a given province. Our research reveals that in 81% of the cases examined, the correction of a wrongful conviction occurred after the secretary of the provincial PLAC, who held oversight over the court responsible for the conviction, had left office. Furthermore, even after the responsible PLAC secretaries had been replaced, if the successors were previously their subordinates, the likelihood of reversing wrongful convictions remained low. Our findings provide persuasive evidence in favour of judicial independence.

Suggested Citation

  • Peiyuan Li & Wei Li, 2024. "Wrongful convictions with Chinese characteristics," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(1), pages 143-163, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:ectrin:v:32:y:2024:i:1:p:143-163
    DOI: 10.1111/ecot.12384
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecot.12384
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ecot.12384?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 169-179, March.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Cristian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Judicial Checks and Balances," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 445-470, April.
    3. Loren Brandt & Debin Ma & Thomas G. Rawski, 2014. "From Divergence to Convergence: Reevaluating the History behind China's Economic Boom," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(1), pages 45-123, March.
    4. Claire S. H. Lim & James M. Snyder Jr. & David Strömberg Jr., 2015. "The Judge, the Politician, and the Press: Newspaper Coverage and Criminal Sentencing across Electoral Systems," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 103-135, October.
    5. Raymond Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, 2015. "The Mortality Cost of Political Connections," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(4), pages 1346-1382.
    6. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
    7. Christina L. Boyd & Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, 2010. "Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 389-411, April.
    8. repec:wyi:journl:002260 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2001. "Incentives and Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199248681.
    10. Levitt, Steven D, 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 270-290, June.
    11. Wayne Geerling & Gary Magee & Vinod Mishra & Russell Smyth, 2018. "Hitler's Judges: Ideological Commitment and the Death Penalty in Nazi Germany," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(614), pages 2414-2449, September.
    12. Bei Qin & David Strömberg & Yanhui Wu, 2017. "Why Does China Allow Freer Social Media? Protests versus Surveillance and Propaganda," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 117-140, Winter.
    13. Egorov, Georgy & Guriev, Sergei & Sonin, Konstantin, 2009. "Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(4), pages 645-668, November.
    14. Cheryl Xiaoning Long, 2010. "Does the Rights Hypothesis Apply to China?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 629-650.
    15. Moses Shayo & Asaf Zussman, 2011. "Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(3), pages 1447-1484.
    16. Raymond Fisman & Jing Shi & Yongxiang Wang & Rong Xu, 2018. "Social Ties and Favoritism in Chinese Science," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(3), pages 1134-1171.
    17. Madhav S. Aney & Shubhankar Dam & Giovanni Ko, 2021. "Jobs for Justice(s): Corruption in the Supreme Court of India," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(3), pages 479-511.
    18. David S. Abrams & Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2012. "Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 347-383.
    19. Michael Firth & Oliver M. Rui & Wenfeng Wu, 2011. "The Effects of Political Connections and State Ownership on Corporate Litigation in China," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 573-607.
    20. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2002. "Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262661314, December.
    21. Carlos Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, 2013. "Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 741-756, July.
    22. Ruixue Jia & Huihua Nie, 2017. "Decentralization, Collusion, and Coal Mine Deaths," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 99(1), pages 105-118, March.
    23. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati & Francesco Sobbrio, 2020. "The Political Cost of Being Soft on Crime: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(6), pages 3305-3336.
    2. Éric Langlais & Marie Obidzinski, 2013. "Elected vs appointed public law enforcers," EconomiX Working Papers 2013-35, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    3. Ash, Elliott & Asher, Sam & Bhowmick, Aditi & Bhupatiraju, Sandeep & Chen, Daniel L. & Devi, Tatanya & Goessmann, Christoph & Novosad, Paul & Siddiqi, Bilal, 2022. "Measuring Gender and Religious Bias in the Indian Judiciary," TSE Working Papers 22-1395, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/12b1pd86do8s6p35b4jqn66t0p is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Andre Assumpcao & Julio Trecenti, 2020. "Judicial Favoritism of Politicians: Evidence from Small Claims Court," Papers 2001.00889, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
    6. Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2010. "Businessman Candidates," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(3), pages 718-736, July.
    7. Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati & Francesco Sobbrio, 2020. "The Political Cost of Being Soft on Crime: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(6), pages 3305-3336.
    8. Shamena Anwar & Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, 2019. "Politics in the Courtroom: Political Ideology and Jury Decision Making," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 834-875.
    9. Cassey Lee, 2007. "Legal Traditions and Competition Policy," Chapters, in: Paul Cook & Raul Fabella & Cassey Lee (ed.), Competitive Advantage and Competition Policy in Developing Countries, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Geerling, Wayne & Magee, Gary & Raschky, Paul & Smyth, Russell, 2017. "Legally Irrelevant Factors in Judicial Decision-making: Battle Deaths and the Imposition of the Death Penalty in Nazi Germany," MPRA Paper 77159, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Haitian Lu & Hongbo Pan & Chenying Zhang, 2015. "Political Connectedness and Court Outcomes: Evidence from Chinese Corporate Lawsuits," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4).
    12. Art Durnev & Sergei Guriev, 2007. "The Resource Curse: A Corporate Transparency Channel," Working Papers w0108, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
    13. Yohei Yamaguchi & Ken Yahagi, 2024. "Law enforcement and political misinformation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 36(1), pages 3-36, January.
    14. Raymond Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, 2015. "The Mortality Cost of Political Connections," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(4), pages 1346-1382.
    15. Liu, Qigui & Luo, Tianpei & Tian, Gary, 2016. "Political connections with corrupt government bureaucrats and corporate M&A decisions: A natural experiment from the anti-corruption cases in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 52-80.
    16. Wayne Geerling & Gary Magee & Paul A. Raschky & Russell Smyth, 2020. "Bad News From The Front And From Above: Bombing Raids, Military Fatalities And The Death Penalty In Nazi Germany," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(3), pages 1450-1468, July.
    17. Djankov, Simeon & Glaeser, Edward & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2003. "The new comparative economics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 595-619, December.
    18. Xu, Gang & Wang, Xue & Wang, Ruiting & Yano, Go & Zou, Rong, 2021. "Anti-corruption, safety compliance and coal mine deaths: Evidence from China," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 458-488.
    19. Xie, Rui & Zhang, Jiahuan & Tang, Chuan, 2023. "Political connection and water pollution: New evidence from Chinese listed firms," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    20. Christian Dippel & Michael Poyker, 2023. "Do Private Prisons Affect Criminal Sentencing?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66(3), pages 511-534.
    21. Theo S. Eicher & Monique Newiak, 2013. "Intellectual property rights as development determinants," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 46(1), pages 4-22, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:ectrin:v:32:y:2024:i:1:p:143-163. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)2577-6983 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.