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Electoral Sentencing Cycles

Author

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  • Galbiati, Roberto
  • Abrams, David
  • Philippe, Arnaud

Abstract

Exploiting features of the North-Carolina judicial system, elections and forced rotation of judges, we overcome major challenges hampering the identifi cation of the existence and source of sentencing variation over the electoral cycle. We show that when elections approach, sentencing for felonies increase. This increase is driven by decisions taken by judges present in their district of election, and only when elections are contested. When judges operate outside their district of elections, sentencing decisions do not signi ficantly vary over the electoral cycle. Our results demonstrate the existence of strategic sentencing by judges in an attempt to please voters and allow us to discard alternative explanations for the rise along the cycle, such as behavioral motives or contextual explanations.

Suggested Citation

  • Galbiati, Roberto & Abrams, David & Philippe, Arnaud, 2019. "Electoral Sentencing Cycles," CEPR Discussion Papers 14049, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14049
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Claire S. H. Lim & James M. Snyder Jr. & David Strömberg Jr., 2015. "The Judge, the Politician, and the Press: Newspaper Coverage and Criminal Sentencing across Electoral Systems," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 103-135, October.
    2. Tabarrok, Alexander & Helland, Eric, 1999. "Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 157-188, April.
    3. Christian Dippel & Michael Poyker, 2019. "How Common are Electoral Cycles in Criminal Sentencing?," NBER Working Papers 25716, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Francesco Drago & Roberto Galbiati & Francesco Sobbrio, 2020. "The Political Cost of Being Soft on Crime: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(6), pages 3305-3336.
    5. David Abrams & Roberto Galbiati & Emeric Henry & Arnaud Philippe, 2022. "When in Rome... On Local Norms and Sentencing Decisions," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 700-738.
    6. Carlos Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, 2013. "Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 741-756, July.
    7. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, 2004. "Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(2), pages 247-263, April.
    8. Levitt, Steven D, 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 270-290, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dippel, Christian & Poyker, Michael, 2021. "Rules versus norms: How formal and informal institutions shape judicial sentencing cycles," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 645-659.
    2. Chika O. Okafor, 2021. "Prosecutor Politics: The Impact of Election Cycles on Criminal Sentencing in the Era of Rising Incarceration," Papers 2110.09169, arXiv.org.
    3. Timothy Frye & John Reuter & David Szakonyi, 2012. "Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace," HSE Working papers WP BRP 08/PS/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    4. Chen, Daniel L., 2024. "Priming ideology I: Why do presidential elections affect U.S. judges," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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