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Large and influential: Firm size and governments’ corporate tax rate choice

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  • Nadine Riedel
  • Martin Simmler

Abstract

Theory suggests that large firms are more likely to engage in lobbying behaviour and are geographically more mobile compared with smaller entities. Conditional on jurisdiction size, policy choices are thus predicted to depend on the shape of a jurisdiction's firm size distribution, with more business‐oriented policies being enacted if jurisdictions host large firms. The paper empirically tests this prediction using local business taxation in Germany as a testing ground. Exploiting rich and exogenous variation in municipalities’ firm size structures, we find evidence for an inverse relationship between the size of hosted entities and municipalities’ local business tax choices. The effect is statistically significant and quantitatively relevant, suggesting that the rising importance of large businesses may trigger shifts towards a more business‐friendly design of (tax) policies. Grandes et influentes : taille des entreprises et choix des gouvernements en matière de taux d'imposition des sociétés. La théorie suggère que les grandes entreprises ont davantage tendance à s'engager dans des activités de lobbying que les plus petites, et qu'elles sont également plus mobiles sur le plan géographique. Dépendamment de la taille des juridictions, on s'attend donc à ce que les choix politiques tiennent compte du schéma de répartition par taille des entreprises au sein des territoires de compétence, et que si de grandes entreprises y sont installées, alors davantage de politiques favorables au monde des affaires y seront engagées. Dans cet article, nous évaluons cette prédiction de façon empirique en nous appuyant sur les données relatives à la fiscalité locale des entreprises en Allemagne. En exploitant la variation riche et exogène de la répartition par taille des entreprises au sein des municipalités, nous constatons les preuves d'une relation inverse entre la taille des entreprises installées dans une municipalité et les décisions en matière de fiscalité locale des entreprises qui y sont prises. L'effet est statistiquement significatif et pertinent d'un point de vue quantitatif, donnant à penser que l'importance croissante des grandes entreprises pourrait initier des changements en matière d'élaboration des politiques fiscales davantage favorables aux grandes entreprises.

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  • Nadine Riedel & Martin Simmler, 2021. "Large and influential: Firm size and governments’ corporate tax rate choice," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 812-839, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:54:y:2021:i:2:p:812-839
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12510
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    Cited by:

    1. Langenmayr, Dominika & Simmler, Martin, 2021. "Firm mobility and jurisdictions’ tax rate choices: Evidence from immobile firm entry," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    2. Katarzyna Bilicka & Evgeniya Dubinina & Petr Janský, 2022. "Fiscal consequences of corporate tax avoidance," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2022-97, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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