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Research joint venture with technology transfer

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  • Chiu Yu Ko
  • Xuyao Zhang

Abstract

Kamien et al. (1992) show that an industry‐wide research joint venture (RJV), compared to the case without any RJV, does not lead to better technological development or a higher consumer surplus. In contrast, we show that every non‐industry‐wide RJV leads to strict improvements in both measures and it also results in higher production efficiency. Furthermore, when technology transfer is possible after making R&D investment, our results continue to hold, and when research efficiency is low, these improvements are further magnified. Governments should encourage innovation through independent collaboration with technology transfer as an alternative to establishing industry‐wide research consortiums. Coentreprise de recherche avec transfert de technologie. Kamien et al. (1992) montrent qu’une coentreprise de recherche (Research Joint Venture ‐ RJV) développée à l’échelle d’un secteur n’améliore ni le développement technologique, ni le surplus du consommateur comparativement à une collaboration sans RJV. En revanche, lorsqu’elles ne sont pas développées à l’échelle d’un secteur, nous expliquons que toutes les coentreprises de recherche permettent non seulement un développement technologique et un surplus du consommateur accrus, mais également une efficacité de production plus élevée. Par ailleurs, nos résultats se maintiennent lorsqu’un transfert de technologie peut s’opérer après réalisation des investissements en recherche et développement ; et lorsque l’efficacité de la recherche est faible, ces améliorations s’amplifient davantage. Les gouvernements devraient promouvoir l’innovation par l’entremise de collaborations indépendantes avec transfert de technologie comme alternative à l’établissement de consortiums de recherche à l’échelle de tout un secteur.

Suggested Citation

  • Chiu Yu Ko & Xuyao Zhang, 2020. "Research joint venture with technology transfer," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 341-358, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:53:y:2020:i:1:p:341-358
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12423
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    References listed on IDEAS

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