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Combinator dynamics: multi-dimensional evolutionary learning

Author

Listed:
  • Arigapudi, Srinivas

    (Department of Economic Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur)

  • Edhan, Omer

    (Department of Economics, The University of Manchester)

  • Heller, Yuval

    (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University)

  • Hellman, Ziv

    (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University)

Abstract

In complex strategic settings with multiple dimensions, players often simplify de- cisions by breaking them down into separate dimensions. In contrast to standard replicator dynamics, which assume perfect multi-dimensional coordination, our com- binator dynamics model captures cases in which players revise actions dimension by dimension, imitate successful traits in each dimension, and then combine the selected traits into a new action. We analyse key properties of these dynamics – monotonicity, stationarity, and stability. We then extend the model to heterogeneous settings, where some players imitate entire multi-dimensional actions while others combine traits imitated separately in each dimension. We apply the framework to organisational decision-making, where decentralised adoption of practices can generate coordination failures, persistent performance differences, and a trade-off between specialised and versatile organisational traits.

Suggested Citation

  • Arigapudi, Srinivas & Edhan, Omer & Heller, Yuval & Hellman, Ziv, 0. "Combinator dynamics: multi-dimensional evolutionary learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
  • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:6279
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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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