Does profit sharing reduce conflict with the boss? Evidence from Germany
This paper argues that, in general, profit sharing aligns the interests of workers and the firm and that this alignment reduces the extent of conflict between workers and management. This paper also argues that this general result will not carry over to the workers least able to respond to the alignment of interests with greater effort and that it will not apply to supervisors. After describing the German use of profit sharing, we use German data to show that for non-supervisory workers in excellent health, profit sharing reduces conflict but that for those who are not in excellent health and for supervisors, profit sharing does not reduce conflict. We also show that independent from profit sharing, conflict with the boss is greater for the aged and for those not in excellent health.
Volume (Year): 19 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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