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Getting along with Colleagues - Does Profit Sharing Help or Hurt?


  • John S. Heywood
  • Uwe Jirjahn
  • Georgi Tsertsvadze


Theory presents two channels through which profit sharing can cause workers to increase their coworkers' productivity: greater cooperation and increased peer pressure. This paper argues that these generate opposite influences on coworker relations, and that which dominates varies according to circumstances and type of worker. Using German data, we show that, for non-supervisory men, profit sharing increases cooperation, but that for those who highly value success on the job, it has no influence on cooperation, and for supervisors it reduces cooperation. Moreover, the findings show striking gender differences in the effect of profit sharing. We contend these patterns fit with underlying theoretical expectations. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..

Suggested Citation

  • John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn & Georgi Tsertsvadze, 2005. "Getting along with Colleagues - Does Profit Sharing Help or Hurt?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 557-573, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:58:y:2005:i:4:p:557-573

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Encinosa III, William E. & Gaynor, Martin & Rebitzer, James B., 2007. "The sociology of groups and the economics of incentives: Theory and evidence on compensation systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 187-214, February.
    2. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 1998. "Mutual Monitoring in Teams: The Effects of Residual Claimancy and Reciprocity," Research in Economics 98-08-074e, Santa Fe Institute.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dur, Robert & Sol, Joeri, 2010. "Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 293-301, July.
    2. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2008. "Cooperation in Knowledge-Intensive Firms," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(4), pages 410-440.
    3. repec:lan:wpaper:2926 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. C Green & J S Heywood, 2007. "Performance pay, sorting and the dimensions of job satisfaction," Working Papers 584041, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    5. repec:eee:indorg:v:52:y:2017:i:c:p:1-29 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger & René L. Frey, 2009. "Editorial Ruminations: Publishing Kyklos," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 151-160, April.
    7. repec:lan:wpaper:2928 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Petr Petera & Jana Fibírová, 2015. "Basic Approaches to Profit-Sharing and Ideas for Utilization," Český finanční a účetní časopis, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2015(3), pages 97-117.
    9. Green, Colin P. & Heywood, John S., 2010. "Profit sharing and the quality of relations with the boss," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 859-867, October.
    10. Colin Green & John S. Heywood, 2008. "Does Performance Pay Increase Job Satisfaction?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(300), pages 710-728, November.
    11. C Green & J S Heywood, 2007. "Does profit sharing increase training by reducing turnover?," Working Papers 589032, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    12. Valeria Maggian & Natalia Montinari & Antonio Nicolò, 2015. "Backscratching in Hierarchical Organizations," Working Papers 299, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2015.
    13. Douglas L. Kruse & Richard B. Freeman & Joseph R. Blasi, 2010. "Do Workers Gain by Sharing? Employee Outcomes under Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing, and Broad-Based Stock Options," NBER Chapters,in: Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options, pages 257-289 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. John Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn & Georgi Tsertsvadze, 2005. "Does profit sharing reduce conflict with the boss? Evidence from Germany," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(2), pages 235-250.
    15. Michelle Brown & John Heywood, 2009. "Helpless in Finance: The Cost of Helping Effort Among Bank Employees," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 176-195, June.
    16. Thomas Cornelissen & John S. Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2010. "Profit Sharing and Reciprocity: Theory and Survey Evidence," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 292, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    17. repec:lan:wpaper:3175 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Derek C. Jones & Srecko Goic, 2010. "Do Innovative Workplace Practices Foster Mutual Gains? Evidence From Croatia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp993, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    19. Thomas Cornelissen & John Heywood & Uwe Jirjahn, 2014. "Reciprocity and Profit Sharing: Is There an Inverse U-shaped Relationship?," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 205-225, June.
    20. repec:lan:wpaper:3020 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Uwe Jirjahn, 2016. "Works Councils and Employer Attitudes toward the Incentive Effects of HRM Practices," Research Papers in Economics 2016-07, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    22. Natalia Montinari, 2011. "The Dark Side of Reciprocity," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

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