Specialization in defence forces
The choice between balanced and specialized defence forces depends on the technology of defence output (e.g. whether a force scope multiplier is present), the existence of scope and scale economies, the platform customization costs and, of course, the level of defence budgets. Minimum force element levels (thresholds), and scale economies facilitate specialization as opposed to scope economies (e.g. platform-sharing), scale diseconomies and the force scope multiplier (e.g. defence weakest-link technology). When a balanced force is not optimal, the option value of a non-optimally maintained force element must also include the opportunity cost arising from suboptimal force elements. Shrinking defence budgets may produce two surprising phenomena. If some force elements are shut down as a result of thresholds, the surviving ones may increase in platform numbers as well as enjoying closer-to-most-desirable platforms. Furthermore, if heritage force elements are shut down within the budget contraction environment, overall defence capability might rise.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 16 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/GDPE20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GDPE20|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Arthur Grimes & James Rolfe, 2002. "Optimal defence structure for a small country," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(4), pages 271-286.
- Arce M, Daniel G, 2001. "Leadership and the Aggregation of International Collective Action," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 114-137, January.
- Murdoch, James C., 1995. "Military alliances: Theory and empirics," Handbook of Defense Economics,in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 89-108 Elsevier.
- Arce M., Daniel G. & Sandler, Todd, 2001. "Transnational public goods: strategies and institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 493-516, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:16:y:2005:i:3:p:191-204. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.