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Leadership and the Aggregation of International Collective Action

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  • Arce M, Daniel G

Abstract

Political entrepreneurs, or leaders, play an important role in overcoming under-provision and coordination problems inherent in international public goods. Recent examples include the Montreal Protocol on ozone depletion and NATO peacekeeping. We demonstrate that the Prisoner's Dilemma need not be a fait accompli of international collective action, owing to the various means for aggregating contributions (summation, best shot, better shot, weakest link and weaker link). Using evolutionary game theory, we examine "leading by example", whereby a leader unilaterally provides an intermediate contribution, and matching behavior there beyond. It is shown to be a noncooperative means for achieving cooperative provision. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Arce M, Daniel G, 2001. "Leadership and the Aggregation of International Collective Action," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 114-137, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:53:y:2001:i:1:p:114-37
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Guth, Werner & Levati, M. Vittoria & Sutter, Matthias & van der Heijden, Eline, 2007. "Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 1023-1042, June.
    2. Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2011. "The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries," Discussion Papers 1103, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    3. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Max-Min Group Contest," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 050, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    4. Emrah Arbak & Marie Claire Villeval, 2006. "Endogenous Leadership - Selection and Influence," Post-Print halshs-00175561, HAL.
    5. João Ricardo Faria & Emilson C.D. Silva, 2017. "Optimal Timing in Rotten Kid Families," CESifo Working Paper Series 6333, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Alejandro Caparrós & Michael Finus, 2016. "Public good agreements under the weakest-link technology," Working Papers 1602, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC.
    7. Ugurhan Berkok, 2005. "Specialization in defence forces," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 191-204.
    8. Gächter, Simon & Renner, Elke, 2014. "Leaders as Role Models for the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 8580, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    9. Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matthias Sutter & Eline van der Heijden, 2004. "Leadership and cooperation in public goods experiments," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    10. Anne van Aaken & Janis Antonovics & Todd Sandler, 2016. "Strategic Aspects of Difficult Global Challenges," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 7, pages 33-44, May.
    11. Emrah Arbak & Marie Claire Villeval, 2013. "Voluntary Leadership: Selection and Influence," Post-Print halshs-00664830, HAL.
    12. d'Adda, Giovanna, 2011. "Social Status and Influence: Evidence from an Artefactual Field Experiment on Local Public Good Provision," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 22, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics.
    13. Giovanna d’Adda, 2012. "Leadership and influence: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment on local public good provision," ECON - Working Papers 059, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    14. Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, 2008. "Matching rules," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 57-70.
    15. Caparros, Alejandro & Finus, Michael, 2016. "Public Good Agreements under the Weakest-link Technology," Department of Economics Working Papers 58129, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    16. repec:kap:enreec:v:67:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10640-016-9997-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Philip J. Grossman & Mana Komai & James E. Jensen, 2015. "Leadership and gender in groups: An experiment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 48(1), pages 368-388, February.
    18. Todd Sandler & Daniel G. Arce, 2007. "New face of development assistance: public goods and changing ethics," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(4), pages 527-544.
    19. Emrah Arbak & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2013. "Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 635-662, March.
    20. Mana Komai & Philip J. Grossman & Evelyne Benie, 2017. "Leadership and the effective choice of information regime," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 82(1), pages 117-129, January.
    21. Seyed Komail Tayebi & Ahmad Googerdchian, 2007. "A Difference-in-Differences (DID) Analysis of Financial Integration and International Trade in ASEAN+5," Iranian Economic Review, Economics faculty of Tehran university, vol. 12(3), pages 109-126, fall & wi.
    22. Lee, Dongryul, 2012. "Weakest-link contests with group-specific public good prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 238-248.

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