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Competition and R&D in retail banking under expense preference behaviour

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  • Luis Granero
  • Juan Carlos Reboredo

Abstract

Cost-reducing R&D activities are examined in the context of a retail banking sector where some entities exhibit an expense preference. The results reveal that the effects from R&D interact with the effects in the previous literature in shaping the equilibrium configuration.

Suggested Citation

  • Luis Granero & Juan Carlos Reboredo, 2006. "Competition and R&D in retail banking under expense preference behaviour," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 47-50.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:13:y:2006:i:1:p:47-50
    DOI: 10.1080/13504850500378098
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-1137, December.
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    3. Purroy, Pedro & Salas, Vicente, 2000. "Strategic competition in retail banking under expense preference behavior," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 809-824, May.
    4. Edward Jones & Jo Danbolt, 2003. "R&D project announcements and the impact of ownership structure," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(14), pages 933-936.
    5. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    6. Poyago-Theotoky, Joanna, 1996. "R&D Competition with Asymmetric Firms," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 43(3), pages 334-342, August.
    7. Hiroshi Izawa & Yoshiro Tsutsui, 1998. "Managerial objectives in Japanese banking: a test of the expense preference hypothesis," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 89-99.
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