External recruitments and firm performance
In the context of tournament theory, and drawing on a panel data set of several firms and their employees, evidence is presented of a negative relationship between the share of external recruitments for top management positions and firm productivity.
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Volume (Year): 13 (2006)
Issue (Month): 14 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
Journal of Political Economy,
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- Pedro Martins & Jim Jin, 2010.
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- Pedro S. Martins & Jim Jin, 2008. "Firm-Level Social Returns to Education," Working Papers 9, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.
- Pedro S. Martins, 2004. "Firm-Level Social Returns to Education," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0404, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
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- Kong-Pin Chen, 2005.
"External Recruitment as an Incentive Device,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 259-278, April.
- Kong-Pin Chen, 2004. "External Recruitment as an incentive Device," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 54, Econometric Society.
- Kong-Pin Chen, 2004. "External Recruitment as an Incentive Device," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 514, Econometric Society.
- Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
- George Baker & Michael Gibbs & Bengt Holmstrom, 1994. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 881-919.
- Francisco Lima & Mário Centeno, 2003. "The Careers of Top Managers and Firm Openness: Internal Versus External Labour Markets," Working Papers w200315, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
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