External recruitments and firm performance
In the context of tournament theory, and drawing on a panel data set of several firms and their employees, evidence is presented of a negative relationship between the share of external recruitments for top management positions and firm productivity.
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Volume (Year): 13 (2006)
Issue (Month): 14 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kong-Pin Chen, 2004.
"External Recruitment as an incentive Device,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings
54, Econometric Society.
- Pedro S. Martins & Jim Jin, 2008.
"Firm-Level Social Returns to Education,"
9, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Business and Management, Centre for Globalisation Research.
- Martins, Pedro S., 2004. "Firm-Level Social Returns to Education," IZA Discussion Papers 1382, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Pedro S. Martins, 2004. "Firm-Level Social Returns to Education," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0404, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Francisco Lima & Mário Centeno, 2003. "The Careers of Top Managers and Firm Openness: Internal Versus External Labour Markets," Working Papers w200315, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
- Baker, George & Gibbs, Michael & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1994. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 881-919, November.
- Eriksson, Tor, 1999. "Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 262-80, April.
- Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
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