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United for change: deliberative coalition formation to change the status quo

Author

Listed:
  • Edith Elkind

    (University of Oxford)

  • Davide Grossi

    (Groningen and University of Amsterdam)

  • Ehud Shapiro

    (Weizmann Institute of Science)

  • Nimrod Talmon

    (Ben-Gurion University)

Abstract

We study a setting in which a community wishes to identify a strongly supported proposal from a space of alternatives, in order to change the status quo. We describe a deliberation process in which agents dynamically form coalitions around proposals that they prefer over the status quo. We formulate conditions on the space of proposals and on the ways in which coalitions are formed that guarantee deliberation to succeed, that is, to terminate by identifying a proposal with the largest possible support. Our results provide theoretical foundations for the analysis of deliberative processes such as the ones that take place in online systems for democratic deliberation support.

Suggested Citation

  • Edith Elkind & Davide Grossi & Ehud Shapiro & Nimrod Talmon, 2024. "United for change: deliberative coalition formation to change the status quo," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(3), pages 717-746, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:63:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00355-024-01561-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-024-01561-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andreas Darmann & Edith Elkind & Sascha Kurz & Jérôme Lang & Joachim Schauer & Gerhard Woeginger, 2018. "Group activity selection problem with approval preferences," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 767-796, September.
    2. Chung, Hun & Duggan, John, 2020. "A Formal Theory of Democratic Deliberation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 14-35, February.
    3. , & ,, 2006. "A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(4), pages 395-410, December.
    4. Arnold, Tone & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2002. "Dynamic coalition formation and the core," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 363-380, November.
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