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Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games

  • Heinrich H. Nax
  • Bary S.R. Pradelski
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    We study evolutionary dynamics in assignment games where many agents interact anonymously at virtually no cost.� The process is decentralized, very little information is available and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously.� We propose a completely uncoupled learning process that selects a subset of the core of the game with a natural equity interpretation.� This happens even though agents have no knowledge of other agents' strategies, payoffs, or the structure of the game, and there is no central authority with such knowledge either.� In our model, agents randomly encounter other agents, make bids and offers for potential partnerships and match if the partnerships are profitable.� Equity is favored by our dynamics beause it is more stable, not because of any ex ante fairness criterion.

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    File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/12040/revised-paper607.pdf
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    Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 607.

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    Date of creation: 01 Jun 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:607
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
    Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
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    1. Fabrizio Germano & Gábor Lugosi, 2004. "Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing," Economics Working Papers 788, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    2. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003. "Kidney Exchange," NBER Working Papers 10002, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Rozen, Kareen, 2008. "Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining," Working Papers 39, Yale University, Department of Economics.
    4. Charness, Gary B & Corominas-Bosch, Margarida & FRECHETTE, GUILLAUME, 2005. "Bargaining and Network Structure: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt7v98682v, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    5. Agastya, Murali, 1999. "Perturbed Adaptive Dynamics in Coalition Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 207-233, December.
    6. Agastya, Murali, 1997. "Adaptive Play in Multiplayer Bargaining Situations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 411-26, July.
    7. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2003. "Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1830-1836, December.
    8. Arnold, Tone & Schwalbe, Ulrich, 2002. "Dynamic coalition formation and the core," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 363-380, November.
    9. Newton, Jonathan, 2012. "Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 364-381.
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