Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Haldun Evrenk, 2009. "Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(1), pages 169-169, January.
- Evrenk, Haldun, 2008. "Three-Candidate Competition when Candidates Have Valence: The Base Case," Working Papers 2008-2, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Martin J. Osborne, 1995. "Spatial Models of Political Competition under Plurality Rule: A Survey of Some Explanations of the Number of Candidates and the Positions They Take," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 261-301, May.
- Norman Schofield, 2007. "The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 965-980.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:57:y:1963:i:02:p:368-377_24 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hug, Simon, 1995. "Third Parties in Equilibrium," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(1-2), pages 159-180, January.
- Lin, Tse-Min & Enelow, James M & Dorussen, Han, 1999. "Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(1-2), pages 59-82, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Haldun Evrenk & Dmitriy Kha, 2011. "Three-candidate spatial competition when candidates have valence: stochastic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 421-438, June.
- Haldun Evrenk & Chien-Yuan Sher, 2015.
"Social interactions in voting behavior: distinguishing between strategic voting and the bandwagon effect,"
Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 405-423, March.
- Evrenk, Haldun & Sher, Chien-Yuan, 2015. "Social interactions in voting behavior: distinguishing between strategic voting and the bandwagon effect," MPRA Paper 62794, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Dimitrios Xefteris, 2014. "Mixed equilibriums in a three-candidate spatial model with candidate valence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 101-120, January.
- Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009.
"Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey,"
Springer, pages 503-538.
- Powell, Benjamin & Stringham, Edward, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," MPRA Paper 26097, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Evrenk, Haldun, 2010. "Three-Candidate Spatial Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Asymmetric Voter Density and Plurality Maximization," Working Papers 2010-1, Suffolk University, Department of Economics.
- Evrenk, Haldun, 2011. "Why a clean politician supports dirty politics: A game-theoretical explanation for the persistence of political corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 498-510.
More about this item
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- H89 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Other
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:32:y:2009:i:1:p:157-168. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .